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Abstract
Tiebout Sorting and Jurisdictional Homogeneity:
Empirical Validity and Ethical Implications
by
Lee Hachadoorian
Advisor: Professor Jochen Albrecht
In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) argues that a large number of
small local governments will function as a market in local services,
leading to efficient allocation of local public goods. This result only
obtains if households actually move in response to local fiscal
differences. Spatial dependence of socioeconomic variables confounds
attempts to infer Tiebout-motivated residential choice from observed
socioeconomic homogeneity. I correct for this by focusing on
socioeconomic difference across local government borders. In an
investigation of socioeconomic sorting in Queens and Nassau Counties,
NY, I find strong evidence of income sorting at the level of small
suburban municipalities and of racial sorting across school districts.
There is no evidence of income sorting across school districts, which I
attribute to NYS school districts’ lack of control over zoning.
This study design exploits the incongruent boundaries of
municipalities and school districts in New York State. In neighboring
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New Jersey, school districts are by law coterminous with municipalities.
I hypothesize that, where boundaries are coterminous, sorting by
school district and municipality will be mutually reinforcing. This
hypothesis is tested in a comparison of income and racial
heterogeneity in Nassau County, NY, with Bergen County, NJ, both
suburban commuter counties within the New York MSA. Sorting is not
found to be higher in Bergen than in Nassau. These negative results
imply that the argued advantages of coterminous boundaries in terms
of citizen oversight (Schwartz 2001) need not be traded off against
increased segregation.
I conclude with a discussion of the scope of public services that may
be allocated via the Tiebout mechanism. Education is a primary good
of such importance to well-being and to democracy that a pure system
of local finance violates Rawlsian principles of justice (Rawls 1971). If
good reasons exist, in terms of efficiency and/or democratic
participation, for supporting local control in public goods with such
significant distributive impacts, equalizing transfers are necessary to
achieve just outcomes. This policy of equalizing transfers is consistent
both with a spatialized Rawlsian theory of justice, as well as with the
welfare economist’s concept of efficiency (Schwab, Oates 1991).
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Public Goods Problem
A central problem in the provision of public goods is accommodating
taxpayers’ varying levels of demand. For a private good like french
fries or televisions, the consumption choices of one person are not
constrained by the choices made by others. I may choose to eat more
french fries than you, or fewer. But the person who wishes to consume
more of a public good like parkland is constrained to consume
whatever level is agreed to by the community. Public goods are in this
sense jointly consumed. Public goods are also defined as
nonexcludable, which means that it is difficult or impossible to control
access to the good. The textbook example is a lighthouse, since the
light of the lighthouse cannot be restricted to shine on only some ships
(nonexcludability), and one ship using the lighthouse does not leave
less light for other ships (joint consumption). Samuelson (1954)
claimed that no decentralized market or voting system could
determine the optimal level of a public good. Samuelson argued that,
since voters can all enjoy the same uniform level of the public good no
matter how much they have paid in taxes (by the definition of a public
1
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good), they have no incentive to reveal their preferences for the public
good, information which is necessary to arrive at the optimal allocation
decision.
One answer to this conundrum is the fiscal sorting model that
begins with Charles Tiebout’s “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”,
an influential 1956 paper that as of January 2011 had 2,454 citations in
the Social Sciences Citation Index (Tiebout 1956). Developing his
theory in response to Samuelson, Tiebout counters that for local public
goods—i.e., public goods whose effects are confined to a small
geographic area—the public goods consumer must reveal their
preferences by actually living in the community that best matches
their preferences. Since preferences are revealed in the residential
location decision, the optimal level of public good provision can be
determined. This outcome requires some assumptions, such as
costless mobility, a large number of communities to select from, and
full knowledge of taxes and services on the part of rational, utilitymaximizing consumers. Considering its genesis as a counter to
Samuelson’s claim that no voting system could achieve the optimal
result, Tiebout’s fiscally induced mobility is often referred to as “voting
with one’s feet”. The end result is homogeneous communities where
all residents are getting exactly what they want, and public service
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provision will be efficient.
This conclusion might seem harmless if households of similar
financial resources sorted into communities based on arbitrary
differences in taste, such as wanting a community with more public
museums versus wanting a community with more public parks. But the
ability of the consumer household to realize its preferences is of course
limited by income. Since microeconomic theory and common sense
indicate that the wealthy will consume more than the poor, this
consumer choice view of residential location implies that high-income
and low-income households will stratify into high-consumption and lowconsumption communities. High-income communities will purchase
more or better public services (e.g., more acres of parkland, better
public education) than lower-income communities, and this is backed
up empirically (Inman 1979). If Tiebout is correct that this outcome is
efficient, the model encourages complacency with regard to both
income segregation and the public service differentials associated with
this spatial inequality.
Despite an entry in the Dictionary of Human Geography, 4th Ed.
(Johnston et al. 2000), and coverage in recent urban geography
textbooks (Kaplan et al. 2004, Pacione 2005), Tiebout sorting has been
little commented on by geographers (but see Harvey 1973, Clark 1981,
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Whiteman 1983, Johnston 1984). Searches of academic databases turn
up articles in journals of economics, political science, and urban affairs.
Several citations appear in articles in the journal Political Geography
dealing with metropolitan fragmentation, but these citations appear
pro forma.
This apparent indifference to a model which “stands dominant” in
urban political economy (John, Dowding & Biggs 1995: 379) persists
despite the relevance of the Tiebout model to areas of inquiry to which
geographers have contributed. To take one example, the Tiebout
literature has developed largely independently of the residential
mobility literature (Kay, Marsh 2007). Geographers who have been
asked to comment on preliminary research for this project have said
that the reasons for household relocation documented in the
residential mobility literature—life cycle (birth of children,
marriage/divorce, retirement, etc.), class sorting, racial or ethnic
clustering or avoidance (Rossi 1980)—must dominate fiscal sorting, if
fiscal sorting is even happening at all. Conversely, the Tiebout
literature has tended to take socioeconomic homogeneity as evidence
for fiscal sorting without accounting for sorting due to life cycle, etc.
While either position might happen to be more nearly correct, neither
position is tenable absent dialogue between the residential mobility
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literature and the Tiebout literature. More generally, Tiebout’s theory
and the public choice model which underlies it must be taken seriously
if we as geographers are to study urban spatial development,
segregation, suburbanization and sprawl, urban inequality,
environmental justice, and other processes which may be influenced
by fiscal sorting. We must understand and quantify the relative
significance of fiscal choice among other choice variables.
The Tiebout model generates claims regarding empirical validity,
economic efficiency, and policy. Empirically, researchers have been
interested in whether the assumptions of the model are met, and in
particular whether evidence supports Tiebout’s initial claim that
households do in fact move in response to fiscal considerations.
Regarding efficiency it is claimed that the sorting outcome cannot be
improved upon. That is, the outcome is a Pareto optimum, a situation
in which no household can be made better off without making another
household worse off. Policy implications take the form of making sure
that the assumptions of the model are met. In particular, the Tiebout
model assumes the existence of a variety of communities for
households to choose among, and Tiebout (1956) and later papers
have therefore opposed metropolitan consolidation.
In subsequent chapters, this dissertation addresses the empirical
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validity of fiscal sorting as a factor in residential location, as well as the
ethical implications of such sorting. First, I address the justice of a
Tiebout landscape, with particular emphasis on urban-suburban
inequality. In examining the geographic literature on social justice, I
move from Rawls’ influential theory of justice (Rawls 1971) to Harvey’s
early and underdeveloped “general characterization” of territorial
social justice (Harvey 1973) to the recent flourishing of interest in
“spatial justice” (Soja 2010). Two empirical chapters follow, addressing
the question of whether households engage in fiscal sorting. I develop
a new method of linking geographic homogeneity of household
characteristics to the Tiebout mechanism. Comparing a fragmented
suburban county and a unified central city county, I find empirical
support for the claim that income and race influence the household’s
choice of local government, with income influencing choice of
municipality and race influencing school district choice. Comparing
suburban counties in different states, I then ask whether
socioeconomic segregation is higher where different kinds of local
governments are coterminous, e.g. where school districts borders are
the same as the borders of general purpose municipalities. A
concluding chapter ties together the empirical and ethical analyses
with comments on educational finance and a discussion of the value of
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the Tiebout model.

1.2 Empirical Investigation of the Tiebout Hypothesis
As discussed earlier, Tiebout (1956) presents a “pure theory” that
assumes certain behavior on the part of consumer-voters, but does not
investigate whether these assumptions are met. Dowding and John
(1994) survey over 200 studies that seek to empirically (dis)confirm
the Tiebout hypothesis. They divide these studies into city-size
interpretations, homogeneity interpretations, capitalization studies,
studies of fiscally induced migration, and micro-level studies. City-size
studies investigate the implications that smaller jurisdictions and more
jurisdictions per capita in a metropolitan area are associated with (a)
greater resident satisfaction with local government and local public
services, (b) greater competition between jurisdictions, and (c) lower
per capita expenditure—and therefore less waste—by local
governments. The general conclusion of Dowding and John is that there
is evidence for (a), no evidence for (b), and that it is wholly
inappropriate to use expenditure as a proxy for efficiency as is done by
previous investigations of (c). I leave off further discussion, as my
empirical work will address household behavior rather than productive
efficiency. As I will develop a new homogeneity test of the Tiebout
model, I will discuss homogeneity interpretations last and in greater
7
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detail, while relying primarily on Dowding and John (1994) for
discussion of the other categories of empirical study.
Capitalization studies look at the impact of taxes and public services
on property values. In theory homebuyers should be less willing to pay
for a house with a high tax burden (negative capitalization) while more
willing to pay for a house with desired locational features including
public services enjoyed by virtue of residence, such as education
(positive capitalization). Using aggregate data Oates (1969) regresses
median home values on communities’ housing and neighborhood
characteristics, effective property tax rates, and educational spending
per pupil. Studies following this general approach are legion, though
many use microdata (often real estate sales data) rather than
aggregate data (such as median home value), and recent studies use
microdata to focus on difference in home prices across jurisdictional
boundaries (Black 1999, Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan 2007, Thorsnes,
Reifel 2007). Oates (1969) is also influential in redirecting attention to
the Tiebout model: following its publication, citations of Tiebout (1956)
explode.
What exactly the finding of capitalization means in relation to the
Tiebout hypothesis is unclear. While there is broad consensus within
urban economics that tax differentials and service differentials within a
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metropolitan area are in fact capitalized into home prices, the Tiebout
model seems to require tax capitalization and service capitalization to
exactly offset each other. Since this implies collinearity in the variables
measuring taxes and services, such capitalization would be statistically
invisible (Ross, Yinger 1999). Thus, if capitalization is found, local taxes
are not fulfilling the role intended by Tiebout as “prices … of
community services” (Tiebout 1956: 422), and the sorting cannot be
efficient.
Studies of fiscally-induced migration generally use aggregate data
to determine whether households with given characteristics are more
or less likely to move to areas with a particular fiscal profile, for
example, whether lower-income households are more likely to move to
areas with particularly generous welfare benefits. These studies
generally focus on interstate or intermetropolitan migration, and are
therefore less relevant to the current investigation. Dowding and John
stress that these aggregate level studies of fiscally-induced migration
are at best corroborative of Tiebout sorting. They argue that
confirming the existence of Tiebout sorting requires micro-level studies
which use surveys to specifically query the reasons why households
say they move. Households must be conscious of of fiscal (tax and
service) differentials to take advantage of them (indeed, full
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knowledge is an assumption of the Tiebout model).
This full knowledge condition is what is under examination in microlevel studies. Dowding and John go so far as to claim that “[v]alidating
the Tiebout model requires demonstrating a motivational link between
tax-service packages and household movement [emphasis added],”
further arguing that “[t]here has been very little empirical study of
motivations of people in choosing a community” (Dowding, John 1994:
§6), a situation which they intend to remedy with “a micro-level test of
the behavioural assumptions of the Tiebout model” ( the subtitle of
John, Dowding & Biggs 1995). Their claims seem to have sparked a
battle over the epistemology of science underlying investigations of
the Tiebout model (Kay, Marsh 2007, Newton 1997, Dowding, John
1997, Dowding 2008, Kay, Marsh 2008). Contrary to Kay and Marsh’s
(2007) claim that the Tiebout literature has been insufficiently
integrated with the residential mobility literature, John, et al. (John,
Dowding & Biggs 1995) discuss push and pull factors and address
family size, job location, and other factors in addition to taxes (viz. the
poll tax in London boroughs) and services. They find that 43% of
London movers consider services important as a pull factor. In
contrast, the American Housing Survey 2007 reveals that, across the
U.S., only 13% and 5% of households pick “Good schools” and “Other
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public services” as being a reason at all for their most recent move,
and only 6% and 1% pick them as the main reason, in both cases lower
than the categories “Other” and “Not reported”. At the very least,
these housing and mobility surveys must engender some degree of
skepticism towards the Tiebout model. A question of debate in the
literature is whether some households choosing a community based on
tax and service packages may be enough (and how many would be
enough) to achieve the efficiency outcome that is the central claim of
the Tiebout model.
Homogeneity studies test the Tiebout model by investigating the
implication, already mentioned, that fiscal choice will lead to stratified
communities. A typical research design is a cross-MSA study which
tests the relationship between jurisdictional homogeneity and the
number of local governments. The researchers begin by choosing the
population characteristics of interest. Since higher-income jurisdictions
spend more on public services (Inman 1979), household income is a
frequently investigated characteristic. The researchers then develop a
homogeneity measure and regress the measure on variables
representing likely influences. These likely influences include the
number and size of jurisdictions in the metropolitan area (Dowding,
John 1994 and citations therein, Pack, Pack 1977, Eberts, Gronberg
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1981, Ottensmann 1982), as well as factors expected to interfere with
the Tiebout mechanism, such as state aid to local governments (Stein
1987). If Tiebout sorting is taking place, greater jurisdictional choice is
anticipated to lead to greater homogeneity in the investigated
characteristics.
Dowding and John argue that these studies are broadly “consistent
with Tiebout, but…not truly corroborative” (1994:774). In particular,
they point out the problem of accounting for statistical sorting. Tiebout
theory predicts that smaller jurisdictions will be more homogeneous
than larger jurisdictions. But any randomly selected subpopulation is
statistically likely to show lower variance over a given characteristic
(i.e., be more homogeneous) than the population from which it is
selected. Therefore, a homogeneity investigation must distinguish
Tiebout sorting (the intentional grouping of households with similar
characteristics) from this statistical artifact. Following Dowding and
John, research design has moved away from the use of cross-MSA
regressions, and instead tests for statistical significance of observed
municipal homogeneity within single MSAs (Heikkila 1996, Bickers,
Engstrom 2006).
I argue that homogeneity tests of the Tiebout model face an even
more severe challenge due to the spatial dependence of
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sociodemographic data. The statistical sorting problem applies to
independent samples. But if households locate near other households
with similar characteristics, a subset selected within a contiguous
geographic area will not be an independent sample, and will be even
more homogeneous than a subset selected at random from across the
MSA. This could lead to misattribution of the socioeconomic
characteristics being sorted and/or the geography being sorted over.
For example, households might sort by religion without regard to
political boundaries, yet because of spatial dependence religious
homogeneity would be found at the level of the political jurisdiction.
Households might sort based on public services provided by one kind
of government, such as school district, but homogeneity would also be
found at the level of the municipality. While this is obvious for the case
where school districts and municipalities are coextensive, it also
applies when municipal and school district boundaries are not
coextensive (provided municipalities are not too much larger than
school districts). In short, existing approaches will tend to find sorting
at whatever geographic unit is selected for study, with no necessary
relationship to the Tiebout mechanism.
Nonetheless, I attempt to resurrect homogeneity investigations of
Tiebout relying on aggregate data, primarily because the availability of
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aggregate data allows research to proceed at low cost, with ease of
replication, and with ease of comparison across time and space. While
micro-level studies may demonstrate the link between tax-service
packages and household behavior, survey data is not always
preferable to aggregate data when they are in conflict. For example, in
studying aversion to majority Black neighborhoods, Harris (2001)
avoids asking survey respondents their attitude toward racial
integration in order to avoid “socially modified responses,” and instead
uses neighborhood composition from the U.S. Census. Interestingly, I
find this to be consistent with Tiebout’s original claim that household
location in space reveals preference in a way that mere survey (i.e.
voting) can obscure. I argue that homogeneity studies of the Tiebout
hypothesis can be corroborative when the method excludes other
explanations of observed sorting. Therefore, rather than use
homogeneity within jurisdictions (as have previous investigations), I
focus on heterogeneity across jurisdictional boundaries. This has some
similarities with the border discontinuity design used in the
capitalization literature. I argue that socioeconomic stratification
across boundaries can be indicative of fiscal sorting if the degree of
stratification is greater than that between neighborhoods that do not
straddle jurisdictional boundaries.
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Thus, in Chapter 3 I present results of a study of jurisdictional
homogeneity in New York State’s Queens and Nassau counties, one
county being part of a jurisdictionally unified central city, the other a
jurisdictionally fragmented suburban county. I find strong empirical
support for income stratification across suburban municipalities. Across
suburban school districts I find ambiguous evidence regarding income
stratification, but strong support for racial stratification. This result
relies upon the fact that municipal and school district borders do not in
general coincide with each other. In contrast, in New Jersey, school
districts are by law coextensive with municipalities. In Chapter 4 I
investigate heterogeneity across jurisdictional boundaries in a
comparison of counties between New York State and New Jersey,
focusing on the suburban counties of the New York–Northern New
Jersey–Long Island CMSA. While it seems plausible to hypothesize that
Northern New Jersey would exhibit stronger income and racial
stratification as households jointly select a municipality and a school
district of residence, the investigation does not support the hypothesis.

1.3 Equity in a Tiebout World
The empirical investigation of this dissertation will support the claim
that households do sort into Tiebout-consistent landscapes. While
supporters of metropolitan decentralization will take this as good news,
15
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John, et al., point out that the policy implications are ambiguous. Their
conclusion is worth quoting at length:
Supporters of Tiebout, aware of its empirical corroboration,
would thus recommend fragmented government to
encourage Tiebout effects. Those who are more concerned
with welfare or egalitarian objectives, believing in the efficacy
of redistributional taxes, may take an opposed policy stance.
To the extent that fragmented government leads households
towards jurisdictions with the lowest tax burden, and this
drives local governments to impose lower taxes in order to
attract households, the result is cheaper and fewer services.
This does not entail Pareto-efficiency, merely different levels
and types of services, which confuses the ability of citizens to
compare local governments and makes the idea of increasing
choice problematic. Our results suggest the consequence
would be fewer services since lower taxes rather than better
services seem to motivate more movers. In the absence of
full needs and resources central grant equalization, fiscal
migration would lead to large inequalities between
jurisdictions and impose heavy tax burdens on citizens who
live in poorer areas. Thus, whilst our findings have important
policy implications, the lessons to be drawn will be
normatively driven by prior political commitments. Contrary
to what most supporters and opponents of Tiebout seem to
believe, the truth of the Tiebout model does not, on its own,
offer lessons for the organization of local government. (John,
Dowding & Biggs 1995:396-7, emphasis mine)
Their view is a necessary corrective, though it would be strange to
suggest—and perhaps I read in too much to think they suggest—that
one’s political commitments are not influenced by empirical analysis.
But clearly they are right about the importance of the normative
dimension. To this end, I devote a chapter to equity in a Tiebout world.
This chapter assumes a particular outcome of the empirical
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investigation, specifically that household sorting is at least partially
driven by fiscal choice, enough so that the sorting landscape that
emerges is consistent with actual household preferences. Further, at
this stage of the investigation, the efficiency claim that is central to the
Tiebout model is not interrogated. Assuming, then, that Tiebout sorting
is occurring and is efficient, I investigate the equity or justice of the
sorting outcome in a geographical context. Tiebout (1956) addresses
choice among small municipalities, a landscape typical of
jurisdictionally fragmented American suburbs. But Tiebout choice can
also be exercised over collections of socioeconomically similar
localities, such as the choice between city and suburb. White flight or
flight-from-blight can be seen as a special case of Tiebout choice
(Mieszkowski, Mills 1993), and persistent inequality between cities and
their suburbs make what might be referred to as the intrametropolitan
scale important for an investigation of spatial equity. More recently it
has been argued that “Tiebout-like exclusion” also can be found wholly
within a single jurisdiction, such as the the unified jurisdiction of a
central city (Lynch, Rasmussen 2004). The Tiebout model was also
extended to encompass subnational migration (i.e., fiscal choice
among states) by Tullock (1971). This so-called Tiebout-Tullock model
has been investigated by Cebula (2009 and references cited therein).
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While households may very well take state-level taxes and services
into account in the location decision, interstate moves involve changes
in employment and social networks that go well beyond the spirit of
the Tiebout model as originally proposed. While interesting, this
represents a distinct set of research questions which I do not engage in
this dissertation.
The substantive focus of the Tiebout model is the balance of taxes
and services in local jurisdictions. I will argue, however, that this fiscal
milieu is difficult in practice to separate from other aspects of the
social and physical environment. Surveys such as the American
Housing Survey and John, et al. (1995), indicate that people choose
neighborhoods/jurisdictions for a variety of competing reasons. Given a
household decision-making process which takes into account not only
the Tiebout-type fiscal calculus but also various aspects of the natural,
built, and social environment, the question with regard to equity is
whether and how this household decision-process creates or reinforces
inequality, and how these various dimensions of household choice
create or reinforce inequality along other dimensions. In the chapter on
equity in a Tiebout landscape, I will further develop the relationship
among the various dimensions of the local environment that motivate
household choice. It is to the possible frameworks for evaluating equity
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that I now turn.
Distributive justice was foregrounded by John Rawls’ pathbreaking A
Theory of Justice (1971), a work whose influence cannot be overstated.
A Theory of Justice revitalized an Anglo-American philosophy which for
much of the 20th century had concerned itself primarily with
conceptual analysis of meaning and language, and had abdicated its
historical role in ethical and political inquiry. Rawls concerned himself
with the long-standing question within Western political philosophy of
the tension between liberty and equality, while challenging a degraded
form of utilitarian thought which had worked its way into policy
analysis via economics (Nussbaum 2001).
While a fuller exposition of Rawls’ theory will be presented later,
perhaps the most widely cited element of his theory is what he calls
the difference principle. This principle states that “[s]ocial and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are … to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 1971: 266). While
arguing from a generally Kantian position emphasizing individual
liberty, Rawls’ difference principle allows for a significant degree of
redistribution, which he believes to be compatible with either socialism
or a welfarist market-economy.
Rawls’ theory has been criticized on libertarian grounds (Nozick
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1974) and Marxian grounds (Miller 1975). It has been criticized for
paying insufficient attention to identity-based political movements, and
to the place of “difference” in culture and political decision-making
(Young 1990). The geographer Gordon L. Clark has criticized the theory
for the lack of social context in the original position (Clark 1986) and
for its inherent individualism (1983, where he nonetheless attempts to
develop a national policy for regional development that is consistent
with the spirit of Rawls’ theory). Some of these challenges, such as the
libertarian and Marxian, are radical, by which I mean that if they are
successful, Rawls theory is left defeated. Other challenges have been
answered by Rawls in later work. For example, Clark’s challenge to the
theory’s lack of social context may be partially met by Rawls adjusting
the theory to account for “reasonable pluralism” in Political Liberalism
(Rawls 1993). And some approaches, such as incorporating the politics
of difference, may be seen as complementary to Rawls’ (near
exclusive) emphasis on distribution (Schlosberg 2007). My focus will be
on spatial complications to the theory in the urban context.
The first attempt toward a spatially contextualized theory of justice
based on Rawls’ theory was David Harvey’s Social Justice and the City
(1973: Ch. 3). While the influence of A Theory of Justice extended far
beyond philosophy, Social Justice and the City was perhaps as
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influential within the narrower confines of the related disciplines of
geography, urban planning, and regional science. In it, we see Harvey
moving beyond the classical location theory in which he was trained
toward a wider engagement with the concerns of poverty, inequality,
class, and political power. Harvey argues that in various ways, urban
form is organized to redistribute income in anti-egalitarian ways. In
moving beyond a a bare concern with the spatiality of service provision
that characterizes Davies’ concept of territorial justice, Harvey makes
use of Rawls’ theory to propose an updated set of principles for a
“territorial social justice” that is sensitive to the spatialized nature of
production. Harvey proposes a spatialized difference principle: “The
mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and economic)
should be such that the prospects of the least advantaged territory are
as great as they possibly can be” (Harvey 1973: 116-117).
However, in considering central city/suburban inequality, Harvey is
pessimistic about achieving territorial social justice under the capitalist
mode of production. Consider the problem of central city
disinvestment. Under capitalism it is rational for capital to flow to the
territory with the highest rate of return. The return on investment of
inner city housing is lower than it would need to be to attract capital
from alternative investment in suburban housing. But liberal solutions
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to this problem which might focus on subsidizing (Harvey says
“bribing”) financial institutions to invest in inner city housing will have
the effect of raising what suburban developers are willing to bid for
access to capital. Overall and in all territories the return to capital will
increase, while the spatial outcome desired may very well be
subverted. “Thus there appears to be a built-in tendency for the
capitalist market system to counteract any attempt to divert the flow
of funds away from the most profitable territories” (Harvey 1973: 113).
These considerations and others lead Harvey to conclude that “the
market mechanism is automatically antagonistic to any principle of
social justice” (Harvey 1973: 116). While Rawls sees his analysis as
consistent with either liberalism or socialism, Harvey believes that
from Rawls’ original position “it is possible to arrive … at a Marx or a
Milton Friedman, but in no way can we arrive at the liberal or [market]
socialist solutions” (Harvey 1973: 109).
Harvey’s earlier chapters on “Liberal Formulations” therefore give
way to the later chapters on “Socialist Formulations”. Although Harvey
claims that “the material content of Part I is not rejected but is
incorporated and given new meaning by the evolving framework of
Part 2” (Harvey 1973: 10), later writers have commented that what
Harvey called a “general characterization” of territorial social justice
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was essentially dropped by him and the rest of the discipline: “[T]he
subsequent development of human geography revealed little progress
in this direction …. So, when Harvey (1996) returned to the subject at
book length twenty-five years on [in Justice, Nature and the Geography
of Difference], his central question of ‘the just production of just
geographical differences’ was virtually the same as before” (Soja 2010,
Smith 2000a: 137, see also Pirie 1983).
The idea of a specifically spatial justice has a checkered history.
Pirie argues that Harvey’s territorial social justice and subsequent
discussion of justice in geography “calls for no other justice
judgements than those which can be made in terms of some concept
of social justice” (Pirie 1983: 470). David M. Smith has perhaps done
the most to establish connections between geography and ethics, and
with liberal borrowing from political philosophy and other disciplines he
situates his investigation of “the place of good fortune” in the tradition
of Western philosophical interest in moral luck, and the idea that
people should not be penalized (or rewarded) for arbitrary differences
(2000a, Smith 1994, 2000b, 2000c). Most recently, urban geographer
Ed Soja reviews the history of the spatial justice concept and its
grounded application in Los Angeles in Seeking Spatial Justice (2010).
Soja notes that until recently geographers have been reticent to even
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use the phrase spatial justice, and argues that geographers, concerned
with a disciplinary history of environmental determinism, have been
reticent to put forward an “assertive spatial perspective” which views
space not as a mere container for social processes, but as dialectically
influencing spatially situated social processes.
Spatial justice, as developed by Soja, is closely related to
environmental justice. Environmental justice concerns how poor and
minority communities are disproportionately impacted by such things
as air pollution, toxic waste facilities, and other anthropogenic
degradations of the environment. While environmental justice is
sometimes defined so as to encompass the impacts of social
environment (Greenberg, Schneider 1996 devotes a chapter to crime
in Camden, NJ), in agreement with Soja I will treat environmental
justice as a logical subset of spatial justice. The mechanisms through
which certain inequities are perpetrated are similar, as disproportional
impact is only possible if classes and/or races are spatially separated.
For example, Hurley (1995) describes how, prior to the era of white
flight, upper-class white executives, middle-class white managers, and
black and ethnic white laborers in Gary, Indiana’s, dominant industry
(steel) faced similar environmental conditions, even while living in
quite distinct neighborhoods within Gary. But the socio-spatial process
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of suburbanization created a new landscape in which, for a time at
least, middle- and upper-class whites removed themselves from the
environmental degradation within the city limits. Pulido (2000) has
argued that the suburbanization of middle-class whites underlies
disproportionate exposure to environmental degradation in Los
Angeles. I will argue that the same socio-spatial processes which lead
to disproportionate exposure to industrial pollution or toxic waste in
poor and minority communities also lead to disproportionate access to
educational resources and other public services. Specifically, an
historical legacy of housing discrimination has created a selfperpetuating system in which neighborhoods with poor schools and
unhealthy environs repel middle-class households while at the same
time severely constraining the life chances of the current residents.
In support of the idea of environmental justice as a component of a
broader, spatial justice, note that the legal pursuit of environmental
equity and educational equity share a similar jurisprudential history.
Both the environmental justice movement and the educational equity
movement have had to deal with the difficulty of proving
discriminatory intent. Both have pursued theoretically easier-to-prove
disparate impact claims, allowed by the implementing regulations of
federal civil rights law (Title VI and occasionally Title VIII Fair Housing
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Act). Both have generally fought against state and local governments
and regulatory agencies—in the educational equity cases because the
governments are the producers of education, while in environmental
justice cases because the governments are being accused of granting
permits or enacting policies that benefit private producers, e.g. a
company seeking a permit for a a waste facility. Both environmental
and educational equity claims have had to deal with a jurisprudential
shift making it increasingly difficult to pursue civil rights claims, and in
particular with the elimination of a private right to sue over alleged
Title VI violations (Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)).
Soja further compares the relative privileging of time over space, of
history over geography, and argues that social processes must be
understood from a perspective that is simultaneously historical and
geographical. Similarly, I will argue that Rawls’ theory, which
addresses distribution across time (generations of persons), must also
address distribution across space: both of natural resource
endowments, as discussed by Smith and by some political philosophers
(Smith 2000c, Pogge 2002), as well as of the concentrations of
economic activity (agglomerations) that define cities themselves. I
therefore propose a modification of Rawls’ principles of justice,
examine the relationship between Rawls’ theory and federalism, and
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argue for the compatibility of a suitably constrained Tiebout model
with a spatialized Rawlsian justice.

1.4 Constructing a Just Tiebout Landscape
Empirical and normative investigation must support each other. The
Tiebout model is a “pure theory” which, like the neoclassical market
model it is derived from, relies upon an implicit empirical claim about
human behavior and an implicit normative claim about the value of
Pareto efficiency. If empirically we fail to find that households make
Tiebout-consistent location decisions, the efficiency claims of the
model are vitiated. Similarly, if we conclude that Pareto efficiency is
normatively subordinate to equity claims, the empirical findings cannot
justify the Tiebout model—they can only serve as evidence in our
policy-making. And, just as a study of the sociology of crime would be
used to try to reduce rather than to justify crime, the finding of fiscal
sorting by households might be used as evidence in crafting a policy to
interfere with fiscal choice, if that is what our normative convictions
demand.
The final question then is what kinds of goods should be distributed
via the Tiebout mechanism? Consider educational finance, which has
been important to the Tiebout literature because it comprises the
largest part of American local government expenditure. Numerous
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studies document the impact of school test scores on housing prices,
indicating that households value and are willing to pay for better
school performance (Black 1999, Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan 2007,
Bogart, Cromwell 1997, Barrow 2002). Tiebout choice may be
promoted as a mechanism for school choice—a commonly suggested
strategy for improving schools (Hoxby 2000). Against this stand studies
indicating that parents have little knowledge of actual school
performance (Buckley, Schneider 2006), and that parents place greater
emphasis on peer group (especially race) than on school performance
in their actual residential choices (Rothstein 2004, Hamilton, Guin
2005).
This is a complex literature which I will not engage experimentally.
Rather, I will argue that the Tiebout model can at best provide a post
hoc justification for a system which was not actually designed as a
system of school choice. Of major concern is the relationship between
small, independent school districts and segregation. Metropolitan
fragmentation increases racial segregation (Woo 2004, Dawkins 2005),
which has been shown to have deleterious effects on academic
performance among minority students (Mickelson 2003). My empirical
finding of greater racial sorting across school districts than across
other types of local governments, and the mutually reinforcing nature
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of school segregation and housing segregation (Orfield 1996, Orfield
1997), strongly suggest that relying on the housing market to
implement school choice would engender even greater segregation.
Yet while the harms in terms of increased segregation are clear,
empirical support for the alleged productivity of smaller school districts
has been ambiguous (contrast Hoxby 2000, Rothstein 2004). Finally,
based on my justice analysis, I argue that education is a primary good
of such importance to well-being and to democracy that tax base
inequalities make a pure system of local finance unjust. If local control
is valued, the actual funding must be supplemented, perhaps even
supplanted, with intergovernmental transfers or a system of central
financing. One might ask, if school choice can improve school
productivity and student outcomes via market competition, whether it
should be implemented directly rather than hitched to the housing
market. After all, Tiebout’s original conclusion that allocation of public
goods via local governments “need not take a back seat to [the
efficiency of] the private sector” (Tiebout 1956: 424) is a far cry from
arguing that public goods ought to be allocated via local governments
or ought to be allocated based on residential location when other
alternatives exist.
In concluding, I defend a circumscribed view of localism that is
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motivated more by the political benefits of citizen participation than
the efficiency effects of the Tiebout model. A certain class of public
services is ideally, perhaps even necessarily, allocated via the Tiebout
mechanism. Tiebout’s original paper discussed a fixed public resource
—the example given was the fixed length of a beach. Access to a
beach must be rationed, while access to education need not be. Given
the efficiency characteristics of the Tiebout model, residential choice
remains a reasonable way to distribute access to fixed resources, and
in analyzing income sorting in Nassau County (Chapter 3) I will suggest
that households are making decisions based on a crucial suburban
amenity, viz. low housing density. Other spatially fixed amenities which
might be allocated via the Tiebout mechanism include natural
amenities and quasi-permanent capital infrastructure such as roads
and sewerage. But these efficiency characteristics cannot suffice to
recommend the distribution of other public services, such as
education, via residential location. That decision must be made on
another basis, and if local provision is retained, compensatory funding
is necessary to assure just outcomes.
What is most interesting is how, while the Tiebout model has all but
been used as an apologia for exclusionary zoning and school
segregation, there is so little diversity in residential living. While the
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household may choose between urban multi-family apartment
buildings, inner-suburan attached housing, and outer-suburban
detached single-family homes, there are many fewer places to go for
households interested in ecovillages, clustered or car-free suburban
housing, limited equity cooperative housing, or mixed-age housing that
incorporates desired care services such as childcare and eldercare. A
reconstituted Tiebout model should focus on what can effectively and
ethically be distributed via housing choice—natural amenities and
parks, infrastructure, density, and design and planning—and on
encouraging for housing the experimentation that markets are praised
for providing.
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2 Justice in Space, Spatial Justice, and the
Structure of Metropolitan Governance
2.1 Introduction
An important criticism of urban fragmentation, and the Tiebout
model which justifies it, is that it is implicated in the middle-class
abandonment of central cities that has left these cities as containers of
concentrated poverty. In 1999, the median household income of all
central places in the United States was $40,000 and the percent of the
population living in poverty was 16%, while the median household
income in the suburbs (the urbanized area not in central places) was
$51,000 and the percent living in poverty was 8%. For New York City,
median household income was $38,000 and the percent of the
population living in poverty was 21%, while the median income in the
metropolitan area’s suburbs was $66,000 and the percent living in
poverty was only 6%. (Figures from Census 2000 “Table GCT-P14.
Income and Poverty in 1999”. Median income rounded to nearest
thousand, percent in poverty rounded to nearest whole number.) There
is some disagreement about whether this poor-city/rich-suburbs
landscape has been produced by a process of “natural evolution”
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driven by decreasing transportation costs and the demand for new
housing, particularly single-family detached housing, or whether it is a
“white flight” response to changing urban racial composition or
deteriorating public services (Mieszkowski, Mills 1993).
A significant body of literature investigates whether white flight is
motivated primarily by race (particularly white avoidance of blacks) or
by central city environmental and fiscal characteristics. While early
work tended to come down on one side or the other, later work was
more nuanced, teasing out the effects while admitting that both were
operative (Krysan 2002). Often the phrase “flight from blight” is used
(instead of white flight) when focusing on this aspect of central city
amenities and fiscal health: as higher-income, white households move
to the suburbs, the deteriorating tax base forces the central city to cut
back on public services like police and education, leading to a vicious
circle of flight and deteriorating services. This kind of fiscally motivated
suburbanization is itself a form of Tiebout choice (Mieszkowski, Mills
1993). Even though a great deal of inequality exists within suburban
areas and within central cities, the legal separation between cities and
suburbs and the persistence of city-suburb inequality make this divide
especially important in any examination of metropolitan inequality. (It
is this internal suburban inequality which will be crucial to the
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empirical analyses of Chapters 3 and 4.)
I begin with a discussion of John Rawls’ influential theory of “justice
as fairness” (Rawls 1971), followed by a discussion of how urban space
complicates this theory, and Harvey’s attempt to create principles of
territorial social justice (Harvey 1973). I then argue for a restatement
of Rawls’ two principles of justice which takes into account the impact
of space on distribution. Finally, I return to the Tiebout model and the
choice of residential location to argue for a basic structure that
achieves spatial justice while preserving household choice.

2.2 Distributive Justice
The most significant modern statement of a theory of justice is the
work of political philosopher John Rawls (1971). Rawls’ method is to
determine what principles would be endorsed by rational, selfinterested parties who are negotiating the “basic structure” of their
society from behind a “veil of ignorance”. The basic structure refers
not only to the governance structure—the constitution and laws of a
nation-state—but also to the economic structure and social institutions,
such as family structure. Behind the veil of ignorance, the negotiating
parties do not know whether they will have any special talents, will be
male or female, rich or poor, or what religion or ethnic group they
might belong to. Not knowing this information, Rawls argues that the
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people in the original position will want to make sure that the worst-off
roles are as well-off as they can possibly be. This leads him to adopt
two principles of justice.
[First Principle:] Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
[Second Principle:] Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971:
266).
These principles are ranked, so that the first principle trumps the
second principle. Thus, “the basic liberties can be restricted only for
the sake of liberty,” not for the sake of ameliorating social and
economic inequalities. Furthermore, within the second principle, (b)
“fair equality of opportunity” takes precedence over (a) the “difference
principle”. These principles are those Rawls believes rational selfinterested actors will settle on behind the veil of ignorance; they are to
guide the adoption of institutions, as well as specific policies, and they
are to benefit classes of people, rather than specific individuals. The
first principle will guide the design of political institutions (a political
constitution), while the second principle will guide the design of social
and economic institutions (Wenar 2008).
The adoption and application of the principles can be seen as
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working in stages, with the veil of ignorance “thinning” in later stages.
The two principles are adopted in the first stage behind a “thick” veil of
ignorance. In the second stage, “representatives” create the political
constitution subject to the first principle and with knowledge of general
facts about the society, including level of economic development,
natural resources and environmental conditions, political culture, etc.,
but still with no knowledge of their own class or individual
endowments. At the third, “legislative” stage, the actors must choose
specific social and economic policies. These choices are guided by the
second principle (i.e., the principle that incorporates both the
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity) in light of all
economic and social facts. It is only in the fourth stage, that of the
actual administration of law, that full knowledge of all facts, including
one’s own personal identity and standing, is allowed (Rawls 1971: §31).
Both principles of justice take precedence over efficiency. An
institution which promotes efficiency would not be chosen in the
original position if it violates either principle of justice. Rawls here
takes efficiency in the economists’ sense of Pareto efficiency, which
indicates a distribution where no one can be made better off without
making someone else worse off. Rawls uses as an example the
organization of labor. An economy may be feudal (that is, based on
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serfdom) or it may be premised upon free labor. To change from one to
the other would involve taking rights away from one class and granting
rights to another class. Therefore both institutions are efficient in the
sense that neither can be altered without reducing the prospects of
some person. But they are not equivalently just. Therefore, another
principle is needed to choose between them.
Rawls is most concerned to justify his theory in contrast to
utilitarianism, and in particular to justify the difference principle in
contrast to the principle of average utility. If one were to adopt the
principle of average utility, one would be willing to risk a reduction in
one’s utility in favor of the likelihood of a greater increase. That is, one
accepts a decreased lower bound to one’s possible income or status or
well-being, however so measured, in exchange for a higher average.
An extreme result of adopting this principle is that the institution of
slavery would be allowed, if one could demonstrate that allowing
slavery raised the average utility in the society. Those who have
adopted the two principles would reject slavery because of the
violation of both principles. The violation of the first principle of equal
basic liberties is obvious, but moreover, Rawls argues that people in
the original position would adopt the second principle over the
principle of average utility, because they would reject any principle
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which traded off a risk of a worse lot (slavery) in favor of an average
improvement. Rawls concedes that it is possible to modify the principle
of average utility (in the first stage of deliberation) to guarantee that
slavery is rejected (in the second stage of deliberation) by assuming a
high degree of risk aversion on the part of those in the original
position, but he argues that this result is more complicated to arrive at
and would therefore not be preferred to the more parsimonious
difference principle.
Importantly, the difference principle does allow some degree of
inequality, perhaps even a large degree of inequality, if the proposed
basic structure improves the lot of the least well-off class. What this
means is that if a proposed basic structure would increase aggregate
welfare at the expense of an increase in economic or social inequality,
that basic structure could nonetheless be adopted if the lot of the
worst-off were improved. For example, suppose that investing extra
resources in the education of “the best and the brightest” leads to an
overall improvement in the standard of living, say because of an
increase in the rate of innovation. Such disproportionate investment
will improve the lot of those toward whom the resources are directed,
possibly increasing inequality. Should a policy such as establishing
“gifted and talented” programs be adopted? According to the
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difference principle, the increased inequality in and of itself is not
disqualifying. But the improved standard of living, if taken as an
average, is immaterial. What matters is the impact on the worst off. If
disproportionate investment in establishing gifted and talented
programs comes at the expense of struggling students, leading to
worse life prospects for these students, this policy would not be
adopted. But if the benefits to society were so great that the least
advantaged students realized an improved standard of living, then the
policy would be allowable, even if there were an increase in inequality.
The important conclusion is that social and economic structures are to
be arranged so as to maximize the expectations of the least well-off
class.

2.3 Spatial Complications
Rawls does not address the spatial dimension of inequality and the
issue of mobility. Rawls framework assumes that the question of
distributive justice is one that is approached by a people with a shared
political and ethical history, and is therefore relevant to the issue of
inequality at a national scale rather than a global or subnational scale.
Rawls initially sidesteps the issue of global distribution by assuming a
closed society: people enter and exit the society only by birth or death.
It has been proposed to extend the difference principle as a principle
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for rectifying global inequalities (Pogge 2002, Pogge 2005, Beitz 2005)
—a move, incidentally, resisted by Rawls (Rawls 1999). Such an
extension of the theory would create significant duties on the part of
the wealthy industrialized countries of the world to aid the less
developed countries. But whichever way the argument about global
redistribution should come down, the issue of distributive justice at the
subnational level is quite distinct.
Within geography, the focus on internal distribution precedes Rawls.
The territorial justice framework developed by Bleddyn Davies is
perhaps the earliest attempt to examine questions of inequality among
administrative jurisdictions (1968). Territorial justice aims at providing
services commensurate with need within each administrative unit. As
such, it is primarily a tool for determining appropriate service-provision
when the funding authority is centralized. It has therefore had great
importance within British geography and related disciplines, since
British local authorities receive their funding from the central
government (Kay 2005). Without modification, this type of analysis has
little relationship to the kind of independent local jurisdictions that are
characteristic of American metropolitan areas, and that the Tiebout
model envisages.
Spatial inequality in the urban system was examined in David
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Harvey’s watershed Social Justice and the City. Harvey argues that
urban form is organized to redistribute income in anti-egalitarian ways.
For example, political processes will tend to reward the well-organized
and well-financed, and usually will reward smaller groups at the
expense of the majority. Poorer city dwellers will lose out due to job
growth taking place primarily in the higher-cost-of-living and
transportation inaccessible suburbs (i.e., the so-called spatial
mismatch problem (Kain 1968, Kain 2004, Ihlanfeldt, Sjoquist 1998)).
Differing social and cultural values make it difficult to measure
preferences and needs among different populations, as well as making
it technically impossible for Pareto optimal outcomes to emerge. The
unavoidably location-specific nature of both natural and produced
amenities make it possible for the wealthy as first movers in a bidding
process to claim the best locations, while leaving the poor to the least
desirable locations. Furthermore, if not enough housing is available for
a given population, the poor may bid very high amounts for the lowest
quality neighborhoods just to avoid losing the game of housing musical
chairs (Harvey 1973).
Harvey goes on to consider the spatial problems of social justice.
Most of his analysis is concerned with interregional equity.
Interregional inequality is problematized by the production process in
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space. Due to agglomeration economies, output may increase if an
industry is allowed to concentrate in a particular region rather than
split across regions. But if national policy were to lock in the first
mover advantage of a specific region, how and to what extent are
other specific regions to be aided in economic development? Harvey
agrees that efficiency is not to be ignored in the analysis, but too often
the focus on efficiency amounts to a tacit endorsement of the status
quo. Harvey, echoing Rawls, proposes two principles of territorial social
justice (broadening from Davies’ “territorial justice” (1968)):
•The distribution of income should be such that (a) the needs
of the population within each territory are met, (b) resources
are so allocated to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects,
and (c) extra resources are allocated to help overcome
special difficulties stemming from the physical and social
environment.
•The mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and
economic) should be such that the prospects of the least
advantaged territory are as great as they possibly can be.
(Harvey 1973: 116-117)

This focus on interregional equity is pursued by Gordon L. Clark
(1983). Rawls’ prioritization of justice over efficiency is further
defended by Clark’s questioning of the very idea of a tradeoff between
equity and efficiency . Clark specifically investigates the tradeoff
between national efficiency and regional equity. If efficiency is defined
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as attaining maximum aggregate wealth for a given set of resources,
technology, and income distribution, then targeting efficiency at a
national level could mean ignoring interregional equity. But Clark
questions why national wealth is to be valued at all. Against the claim
that national wealth is valuable because of the benefits to regions or
individuals, Clark counters that clearly not all regions or individuals
benefit from an increase in national wealth. Thus, some concept of
social justice is necessary to evaluate the outcomes for regions or
individuals, and efficiency must be treated as a means to achieve the
normative goals decided upon. Maximizing national or aggregate
wealth can be justified by an appeal to utilitarianism, but this is exactly
the view which Rawls seeks to supplant. Clark goes on to develop
guidelines for a national urban policy sensitive to Rawls’ difference
principle, though he is also critical of the inherent individualism of
Rawls’ approach.
Returning to Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice, the
question is how these principles might apply to urban (rather than
interregional) inequality. As discussed in the first chapter, it is
consideration of the urban system which leads Harvey to conclude that
“the market mechanism is automatically antagonistic to any principle
of social justice” (Harvey 1973: 116). Harvey’s “Liberal Formulations”
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give way to “Socialist Formulations”, and the socialist chapters of Part
2 of Social Justice and the City leave many of the specific questions of
the liberal chapters behind. Incomplete analyses and tentative
endorsements of Tiebout and Rawls from Part 1 are not reappraised,
but the reader is left seeing them as inconsistent with Harvey’s later
analysis. Are they still useful theories, to be rejuvenated with
appropriate modifications for place, space, and scale? Can some
version of them be adjusted to fit within a socialist analysis based on
concepts of surplus value, alienation, or class-monopoly rent? Their
ambiguous status is unfortunate, as the shift in Harvey’s analytical
frame coincides with, and heavily influences, a broader shift within
economic geography towards political economy approaches. The result
is that the ethical and political questions raised in Harvey’s liberal
chapters are left behind (while ethics and politics are engaged
differently within the new frame of Marxist political economy), and not
just by Harvey but by most geographers; while the empirical questions
have continued to be pursued in ignorance of Harvey’s challenge to
the “artificial separation of methodology from philosophy” (Harvey
1973: 11).
Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice (above) formed a
starting point for further inquiry. “However, the subsequent
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development of human geography revealed little progress in this
direction …. So, when Harvey (1996) returned to the subject at book
length twenty-five years on [in Justice, Nature and the Geography of
Difference], his central question of ‘the just production of just
geographical differences’ was virtually the same as before” (Smith
2000a: 137). David M. Smith has attempted to develop this thread
within geography, with liberal borrowing from political philosophy and
other disciplines (2000a, Smith 1994, 2000b). He situates his
investigation of “the place of good fortune” in the tradition of Western
philosophical interest in moral luck, and the idea that people should
not be penalized (or rewarded) for arbitrary differences.
Rawls argues that the distribution of social primary goods such as
income, wealth, and political rights may not depend on arbitrary
characteristics of individuals, such as race or age. He was criticized for
not extending this to (arguably) equally arbitrary characteristics such
as health and intelligence. Smith extends this argument from
arbitrariness to the luck of being born and/or educated in one place or
the other. Great differences in life chances attend to someone’s birth
within one country or another, and even “within nation states, the
quality of such services as health care and education may be so
variable as to depend on what in Britain is referred to as a ‘post-code
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lottery’” (Smith 2000a: 141-142). Smith argues for the general
principle of “the more equal the better,” softened by the caveat that
“the objective of reducing inequality, of moving towards equality, need
not require a commitment to the achievement of perfect equality, soon
or ever. Perfect equality may be held out as an ideal …, but in the real
world of moderate scarcity, selfishness and actual inequality it is
practically impossible, and not necessarily right” (Smith 1994: 118).
While Smith and others focus on health care and education as being
important in virtue of the fact that access to these goods is a major
component of equality of opportunity, we can go further in observing
the important neighborhood effects associated with production of
healthy and educated individuals. For education, a long literature
supports the idea that educational outcomes are strongly influenced by
peer group composition. While Rawls envisages monetary
redistribution among individuals, and Harvey and Smith lead us toward
the idea of monetary redistribution among regions, this proposed
redistribution can be significantly undermined by neighborhood effects.
Duncombe and Yinger (1997) estimate that large city school districts in
New York State would have to spend twice as much per pupil to
achieve equivalent outcomes. Betts and Roemer estimate that
equalizing opportunity between black and white males would require

46

Chapter 2
spending nine times as much on the black students per capita (Betts,
Roemer 2007). While racism doubtless plays a role in the different
outcomes (Betts and Roemer use earning potential as the measure of
outcome) of blacks and whites, racial differences in access to
education manifest spatially. A large part of this difference may be due
to the layering of neighborhood effects on top of racial segregation and
class/income/education segregation.

2.4 Spatialized Justice as Fairness
Rawlsian liberalism has not engaged urban inequality, or spatial
inequality generally, and would need to be modified in order to do so. I
have already discussed Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice,
as well as the lack of subsequent development, by him or other
geographers, following his conclusion that “programmes which seek to
alter distribution without altering the capitalist market structure within
which income and wealth are generated and distributed, are doomed
to failure” (p. 110). But Harvey, already moving beyond liberal
formulations, thought that the principles of territorial social justice
could be used to guide a decentralized planning (i.e., nonmarket)
process. It is with this in mind that I attempt to describe a basic
structure that is consistent with territorial social justice, but, as with
Rawls, I try to develop principles that are neutral with regard to
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capitalist or socialist economic organization.
There are several reasons for following this approach, not least of
which is my disagreement with fundamental aspects of the Marxian
program, including its millenarianism and its theory of surplus value. A
full discussion is beyond the scope of this work. But a full discussion is
also not necessary, as others have argued the compatibility of liberal
or even specifically Rawlsian approaches to Marxian political economy.
Katznelson argues that the Marxist critique of liberal rights was so
thoroughgoing as to leave Marxist political economy with no tools for
creating an arena for the representation of competing interests, in
effect relinquishing such questions to liberal theory. “[L]iberal theory
as it has developed [since Rawls] deserves our close attention because
it currently constitutes the only serious site for deliberation about the
principles and convictions that might help craft desirable political
regimes…” (Katznelson 1997: 48). Further, there has been at least one
serious attempt to extend Rawls’ theory in a Marxist direction,
primarily through the addition of a principle of meeting basic needs,
with priority over (modified versions of) Rawls’ two principles (Smith
1994 discusses at length, Peffer 1990). Thus, while my own convictions
are more compatible with liberalism, I believe the result of my
investigation will be valuable to both liberal and radical geographers.
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As already noted, Rawls proposes a four-stage sequence for arriving
at justice. The spatial organization of urban systems interferes with
achieving justice, primarily through the mutually reinforcing racial and
socioeconomic segregation of both housing and education. An
immediate question is at what stage of the four-stage sequence should
spatial factors be taken into account? The answer is that we must
consider spatial factors at each stage in order to develop a basic
structure that is just, although we might conclude that space is not
relevant in each of the four stages.
Harvey’s two principles clearly echo Rawls’ two principles, and we
therefore might be tempted to treat them as the results of first-stage
deliberation. But they mix ideas relevant to more than one stage in the
sequence. Each part of Harvey’s principles has an analogue in Rawls’
theory. Principle 1(a) concerns territorial need, and is equivalent to
Rawls’ discussion of the “social minimum”, a minimum income
guaranteed to all persons based on need (Rawls 1971: 244). Principle
1(b) aims to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects, and is
equivalent to the goal of maximizing welfare, which is not a principle of
justice in Rawls’ scheme (Rawls 1971: 266). Principle 1(c) allocates
extra resources to “help overcome special difficulties stemming from
the physical and social environment”, and can be related to what
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Rawls calls “the principle of redress” (Rawls 1971: 86). Finally,
principle 2 is a direct application of the difference principle to
territories rather than social positions.
Of these, meeting territorial need and maximizing interterritorial
multipliers are legislative (third) stage tasks. Further, welfare
maximizing, as would be the point of maximizing interterritorial
multipliers, must be subordinate to the demands of justice by
reference to Rawls’ second priority rule (1971: 266). Principle 1(c) aims
to redress environmental inequalities, and we can compare it to Rawls’
discussion of the redress of inequalities in natural advantages of
persons. He argues that the principle of redress is a prima facie
principle insufficient to serve as “the single aim of a social order”, and
that the difference principle achieves some of the intent principle of
redress. Again, consider education and the question of whether to
concentrate educational spending on a particular group of students.
According to the principle of redress, additional funding should be
directed to the education of the least advantaged students. The intent
of the principle would seem to be to improve the life chances of the
least advantaged. The difference principle achieves this without
insisting upon compensatory funding as the particular mechanism. It
would allow (indeed require) us to direct greater funding toward the
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more talented students if (as was previously hypothesized) such a
policy would improve the well-being of the less talented students
(Rawls 1971: 86–87). The three components of principle 1 are not the
equivalent of a first-stage principle of justice, and principle 2 appears
to be nothing more than a restatement of the difference principle in an
explicitly territorial manner. Hence Pirie’s conclusion that this and
subsequent discussion of spatial justice “calls for no other justice
judgements than those which can be made in terms of some concept
of social justice [emphasis mine]” (Pirie 1983: 470). I will argue that in
addition to considering how space affects the basic structure at the
later constitutional, legislative, and administrative stages, a true
spatial justice requires the modification of the first stage principles of
justice, and in at least one specific way, namely in accounting for
access to immobile resources.
At the first stage, behind the “thick” veil of ignorance, the parties
nonetheless have knowledge of general facts about human society,
including political and economic theory. They do not know
particularities about their society, such as the level of civilization—a
restriction which implies that, in spite of the similarities in terms of the
emphasis on contract, this is not the same as a theory based upon the
concept of a state of nature. The parties do not know which generation
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they belong to. Generation and level of civilization would seem to be
linked, so knowing one implies knowing the other. But Rawls
introduces the concept of generation in order to address justice
between generations, particularly with regard the conservation of
natural resources and the savings rate (Rawls 1971: §24). Rawls’
discussion points to the obvious fact that the parties in the original
position have a concept of time—perhaps already implicit within the
idea that they know political and economic theory, but made clear by
the examples of conservation and savings. I contend that space, like
time, must be among the “general facts [which] affect the choice of
the principles of justice”—in fact, time and space are supremely
important. Space and time are the substrate for all social science, in
fact all human knowledge and experience.
With this knowledge of space comes a particular fact and a
particular class of theories which are sufficiently important as to affect
the choice of principles. The fact is that natural resources are
heterogeneously distributed. Here I include not only resources such as
forests and fossil fuels, but also any variation in physical geography
that might affect distribution, such as fertile soil or deep draft ports. In
addition to this fact, various theories of location demonstrate that,
even given a counterfactual homogeneous physical geography,
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concentrations of population and industry will emerge through the
operation of market forces. These concentrations include concentric
zones of agricultural use around the urban core (Thünen 1966 [1826]),
concentric zones of other economic activities as established in the
urban economics literature (Alonso 1964, Muth 1969, Mills, Resources
for the Future 1972), systems of small and large cities as in the central
place theory of Christaller and Lösch, and industrial agglomerations
which create external economies of scale. All of these concentrations
will have distributive impacts.
How might the fact of variation in natural resources and other
aspects of physical geography modify the principles of justice and the
basic structure? While Harvey discusses “special difficulties stemming
from the physical … environment,” special difficulties, like scarcity
itself, are socially created. They are only those difficulties special to a
particular region in relation to other regions. (This is of course merely
an elaboration of Harvey’s meaning.) In terms of modifying the
principles of justice, the idea of aiding regions that are specially
disadvantaged can be better conceptualized as equalizing in relation to
access to all natural resources and favorable or unfavorable
characteristics of the physical environment. How the society chooses
to do so is of course decided at a later stage of the sequence of
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creating the basic structure, and Rawls wants his principles to be
compatible with both democratic socialism and democratic capitalism.
A socialist state might go so far as to decree that natural resources
and land be owned by the state (all land, or perhaps merely land which
offers unique advantages, such as port access). Under capitalism,
where there might be a preference for retaining private ownership of
land and natural resources, the state must nonetheless have a process
in place for ensuring equal access, equal opportunity of access, and/or
compensation for exclusive use.
Elided in the quotation from Harvey in the last paragraph is a
reference to the social, as well as the physical environment. Again, we
observe that special difficulties of the social environment are (a
fortiori) socially created, and that the issue again is equalizing between
those regions and areas which are specially (dis)advantaged
economically and socially. This connects neatly with the second way in
which space must affect the choice of principles of justice, which is the
uneven distribution of economic activity accounted for by theories of
location. Although these theories are based on analysis of market
forces, the spatial distributions that they predict must nonetheless be
either adopted or rejected in a planned economy, and a planned
economy might well organize production so as to mimic certain
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aspects of these arrangements, as we see with Harvey’s principle that
economic activity should be organized so as to take advantage of
interregional multipliers. Under capitalism, capital may move to seek
the highest return, but under either a planned economy or market
socialism, capital must still be committed to specific locations, possibly
for very long periods of time. Planners would want to make such
decisions in a way that maximizes welfare, constrained by whatever
principles they choose to guide them, which is consistent with Rawls’
point that welfare and efficiency are still valued, but justice is given
priority. The point may be driven home by noting the difference
between Christaller’s and Lösch’s approach to central place theory.
While both relied upon a theory of supply-and-demand-based market
behavior, Lösch’s version of central place theory was unabashedly
normative.1 The point of all this is that some degree of variation of
economic activity, at the scale of the city, systems of cities, the nation,
and the world, will emerge or be intentionally created under any mode
of production, and the principles of justice need to take this into
account. Leaving aside how a market socialism might decide on where
to invest capital, it is clear that even under democratic capitalism the
1 The colophon from the concluding chapter of Smith’s Geography and Social Justice
compares Lösch’s remark that “The real duty…is not to explain our sorry reality,
but to improve it” to a similar point made by the well-known moral philosopher
Bernard Williams: “The point of morality is not to mirror the world, but to change
it.” (Smith 1994: 279)
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state must retain some authority over where capital is invested, and
how so. This could include land use planning at the city and regional
scale, inducements to bring capital to regions facing capital shortages
(a move which Harvey believes to be self-defeating and which, as we
have seen, leads him to the conclusion that capitalism is incompatible
with social justice), and/or requiring compensation for the privilege of
locating in areas with unique social and economic advantages.
With these discussions in mind, I propose the following
modifications to Rawls’ two principles (with my additions in italics):
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle and the principle of sharing the advantages and
liabilities of locations and natural resources, and (b) attached
to offices and positions and locations open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
Rawls distinguishes capitalism from socialism in that capitalism
allows private ownership of capital and natural resources, but the
ownership models for capital and land need not be the same. Many
readers will probably recognize a Georgist middle way that treats
capital as a productive factor that should remain under private control
and be duly rewarded, while asserting a collective interest in landed
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property (George 1879). The method of sharing the advantages and
liabilities of locations and natural resources might vary under socialism
and capitalism, but even under capitalism, justice would require that
land and natural resources be subject to high levels of taxation with a
strong presumption of state authority to (democratically and
judiciously) exercise eminent domain and control land use planning.
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3 Homogeneity Tests of Tiebout Sorting: A
Case Study at the Interface of City and Suburb
3.1 Introduction
One of the central problems in the provision of public goods is the
lack of incentive for voters, who enjoy a common level of public service
unrelated to their individual tax bill, to reveal their true demand.
Tiebout (1956) proposes that for local public goods—i.e. those public
goods whose benefits are confined to a small geographical area, such
as playgrounds, elementary education, and fire protection—
preferences will be revealed if households “vote with their feet” by
moving to the jurisdiction that best matches their desired mix of taxes
and services. This will lead to jurisdictions which are homogeneous
with respect to public service demand. Furthermore, such
homogeneous jurisdictions sidestep the inefficiency associated with
demand diversity—that is, it eliminates the situation where some
households are forced to pay for a higher level of service than they
want, while other households that would be willing to pay for a higher
level of service are prevented from doing so.
If public service demand correlates with observable household
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characteristics, jurisdictions will also be homogeneous with respect to
these observable characteristics. Thus, a long literature attempts to
corroborate the Tiebout model by looking for evidence of such
homogeneity. But using jurisdictional homogeneity as a test of the
Tiebout hypothesis is complicated by several factors. First, Tiebout
sorting must be distinguished from what we might refer to as nonTiebout sorting. A quick glance at the sociodemographic geography of
any large city suggests that a large degree of sorting (by race or
ethnicity, age, economic status, demand for non-public locational
amenities, etc.) takes place within jurisdictions. If taxes and services
are uniform throughout the city, such intrajurisdictional sorting cannot
be accounted for by preferences in public services. Similar
sociodemographic factors influence sorting in the suburbs, so an
evaluation of Tiebout theory should not use such “baseline” sorting as
evidence in favor of the theory.
Second, some of the apparent homogeneity of small jurisdictions is
merely a statistical artifact. One of the implications of the Tiebout
model is that an increase in the number of jurisdictions (for a given
population) will lead to greater “consumer choice” among jurisdictions,
and therefore to more homogeneous jurisdictions. Since Dowding and
John (1994) it has been recognized that this increased homogeneity is
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at least partly a statistical artifact, since any randomly selected
subsample is statistically likely to be more homogeneous than the
population from which it is drawn.
Third, no research that I know of has addressed multiple scales of
sorting, and the statistical problem posed by spatial dependence of
population data. This can lead to a misattribution of the scale of sorting
(e.g., Tiebout-induced sorting at the municipal level could be
interpreted as sorting at the school district level, or vice versa) and of
the cause of sorting (i.e., the sociodemographic dimensions along
which people sort themselves).
Because of these issues, homogeneity has been found where it is
has been looked for. Therefore, in this chapter I develop a method for
finding sorting that is a priori agnostic about what political unit will
exhibit sorting behavior. Homogeneity and sharp sociodemographic
transitions can be read off of the landscape. Neighboring census tracts
are paired across the study area and metrics of difference are
calculated for the neighboring populations, including three alternative
measures of income heterogeneity and, for categorical data such as
race and presence of children, indices of dissimilarity. I hypothesize
that if some of the observed sorting is due to the Tiebout mechanism,
the sharpest differences should coincide with political and service
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boundaries, and test this hypothesis using OLS regression.

3.2 Sorting Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis
A typical investigation of the sorting implications of the Tiebout
hypothesis is a cross-MSA study which tests the relationship between
jurisdictional homogeneity and the number of local governments. The
researchers begin by choosing the population characteristics of
interest. Since higher-income jurisdictions spend more on public
services (Inman 1979), household income is a frequently investigated
characteristic. After selecting a population characteristic, the
researchers develop a homogeneity measure (examples of which are
discussed below) and regress the homogeneity measure on variables
representing likely influences. These likely influences include the
number of jurisdictions, as well as factors expected to interfere with
the Tiebout mechanism such as state aid to local governments. If
Tiebout sorting is taking place, greater jurisdictional choice is
anticipated to lead to greater homogeneity in the investigated
characteristics.
Several such studies compare a measure of homogeneity with
jurisdictional choice. Pack and Pack (1977) characterize Pennsylvania
towns as homogeneous or heterogeneous by applying a modified Leik
Index to ranked income, occupation, household type, education, and
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age characteristics. They find that only 2% of towns are age
homogeneous, while 42% of towns are homogeneous by household
type, and 41% are homogeneous by occupation. They find 36% of
towns homogeneous by education level, but only 11% of towns
homogeneous by income level. Pack and Pack emphasize the low level
of income homogeneity found in their study, and conclude that “either
the desire for homogeneity is less important than is generally
believed” or other factors are interfering with the sorting mechanism
(1977: 199).
Eberts and Gronberg (1981) investigate income sorting at the
school district level across 34 MSAs within seven states. They
characterize homogeneity by the Theil entropy measure of income
inequality, a measure which is decomposable into within-group and
between-group inequality. Their dependent variable, representing
heterogeneity, is within-jurisdiction inequality divided by total
metropolitan inequality. A larger number of jurisdictions is expected to
increase sorting, and therefore decrease the heterogeneity measure.
Regression across MSAs confirms the expectation. They also find that
heterogeneity decreases with demand for educational services
(represented as the percentage of the population under age 18).
Heterogeneity increases with average district population, equalizing
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aid from the state, and total MSA inequality. “One might expect that
since an increase in total inequality causes a greater disparity within
the population of relative tax burdens of families and their preferences
of local public goods, there would be a greater incentive for families to
stratify” (1981: 237). Their results generally confirm predictions of the
Tiebout hypothesis.
Dowding and John (1994) discuss these and other investigations of
the Tiebout hypothesis in a section on homogeneity and sorting
implications. They claim that these studies are broadly “consistent with
Tiebout, but…not truly corroborative” (1994: 774). In particular,
Dowding and John point out the problem of accounting for statistical
sorting. Since many smaller jurisdictions provide more choices for
possible residents, a prediction of Tiebout theory is that smaller
jurisdictions will be more homogeneous than larger jurisdictions.
However, any randomly selected subpopulation is statistically likely to
show lower variance than the population from which it is selected.
Therefore, another problem in evaluating Tiebout theory is
distinguishing Tiebout sorting from this statistical artifact. Dowding and
John conclude:
Correlating the number of jurisdictions with degree of
homogeneity does no more than confirm the null hypothesis
—since statistically that is what we should expect. That
sorting occurs beyond this is almost certainly true but the
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research shows mixed evidence that local tax and
expenditure variables affect the process…. Few writers are
aware of the logic of different sorting processes and so do not
even attempt to distinguish between them. Future research
needs to refine the measures in order to produce relevant
tests of Tiebout (Dowding, John 1994: 775).
Following Dowding and John, researchers have applied new
methods to control for the problem of statistical sorting. Interestingly,
these studies move away from the use of cross-MSA regressions, and
focus instead on whether observed municipal homogeneity within a
single MSA is statistically significant. If the observed homogeneity is
not statistically significant, there is no reason to “explain” the variance
in homogeneity using cross-MSA methods. Two examples follow.
Heikkila (1996) uses tract-level data to investigate sorting in Los
Angeles County. He uses factor analysis to reduce a large number of
sociodemographic variables to 16 factors explaining 70% of the
variance in the original dataset. He then uses and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to determine whether these factors are significantly different
from each other at the municipal level, and finds that they are for 15
out 16 of the retained factors.
Bickers and Engstrom (2006) use data from the Atlanta and Houston
Table 3.1: Study Area Characteristics
Population 2000
Density 2000 (persons / sq mi)
Municipalities
Unincorporated Areas
School Districts

Queens County
2.2 million
21000
1 city (part of New York City)
None
7 (elementary)
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Nassau County
1.3 million
4700
2 cities; 64 villages
3 towns
54 (unified or elementary)
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas to compare degrees of sorting on a
composite diversity measure that encompasses age, education,
income, housing structure, occupation, race, and ethnicity at the level
of the census tract. They then use Monte Carlo iteration to bootstrap
spatial information about residential choice in their study areas. Monte
Carlo iteration is the repeated simulation of a probabilistic process in
order to generate a sample population of outcomes. Real-world
observations can then be compared to this population of possible
outcomes in order to determine whether the observed outcome is
likely or anomalous. For each municipality in the two MSAs, they
evaluate the likelihood that the observed diversity is due to random
chance. They reject the null hypothesis of random sorting (p < 0.05)
for only 4 out of 44 Houston municipalities and none of 42 Atlanta
municipalities. They therefore conclude that for most municipalities,
observed sorting is not due to a Tiebout-type process.
Although Dowding and John call attention to the problem of
statistical sorting, homogeneity tests of the Tiebout hypothesis face a
more severe challenge due to the spatial dependence of
sociodemographic data. The statistical sorting problem that Dowding
and John describe is that a randomly selected subset of households
within an MSA is statistically likely to be more homogeneous than the
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MSA as a whole. But if households locate near other households with
similar characteristics, a subset selected within a contiguous
geographic area will not be an independent sample, and will be even
more homogeneous than a subset selected at random from across the
MSA. For example, households might sort by religion without regard to
political boundaries, yet because of spatial dependence religious
homogeneity would be found at the level of the political jurisdiction.
Households might sort based on public services provided by one kind
of government, such as school district, but homogeneity would also be
found at the level of the municipality. While this is obvious for the case
where school districts and municipalities are coextensive, due to
spatial dependence homogeneity at the municipal level will be found
even when municipal and school district boundaries are not
coextensive (provided municipalities are not too much larger than
school districts). In short, existing approaches will tend to find sorting
at whatever geographic unit is selected for study, with no necessary
relationship to the Tiebout mechanism.

3.3 Methods and Data
In order to investigate whether and at what level of government
Tiebout sorting is taking place, I investigate the neighboring counties
of Queens and Nassau in the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long
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Island MSA (See Table 3.1). Queens (2.2 million population in 2000) is a
jurisdictionally unified county that is part of New York City. Queens
(indeed, all of New York City) has one secondary school district, but
several elementary school districts. Nassau has 54 school districts and
70 general purpose governments for a smaller population (1.3 million
in 2000). The general purpose governments in Nassau include the
county government, 3 towns (incorporated county subdivisions), 2
cities, and 64 villages. In New York State, all land is in either a city or a
town, but not both.2 Villages are incorporated areas within towns.
Therefore, land in Nassau may be city; town but not village; or town
and village. Villages can cross town borders (which 7 in the study area
do) as well as county borders (which none in the study area do). Cities
differ from towns in having greater autonomy and individual charters,
while villages follow a standard form of government set by state law.
Villages choose which services to provide on their own and which
services to have the town provide. Cities and villages in Nassau are
similar in that they are both geographically small incorporated
municipalities. Cities and villages control their own zoning, while towns
control zoning for those parts of the town which are outside of villages
(NYS DOS 2008).
2 Some state land is in Indian Reservations, which are legally distinct and not part of
either cities or towns. There are no Indian Reservations in Queens or Nassau
County.
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While New York State law has its own unique typology of school
districts, most of Nassau’s 54 school districts are classified by the US
Census Bureau as unified school districts, which means they
encompass both elementary and secondary schools. School districts in
most of New York State (including Nassau) have the power to levy
property taxes. Their budgets are submitted to local voters. If rejected,
the school district can submit a revised budget for a vote or can
operate under a “default” budget which allows certain automatic
spending increases from the previous year’s budget. In Queens (NYC),
the school district is financed by general funds. The study focuses on
secondary school districts (and unified school districts, which are also
secondary school districts). Elementary only borders are ignored, as
the results of early analysis distinguishing elementary from secondary
school districts were difficult to interpret. School districts in New York
State can (and in the study area do) cross village, town, and county
borders. One school district crosses the border of Nassau and Suffolk
counties. No school districts cross the Queens–Nassau border (NYS
DOS 2008).
The study design is a priori agnostic about what types of local
governments might show evidence of Tiebout-induced homogeneity.
Instead of looking for evidence of homogeneity among households or
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census tracts grouped by jurisdiction, local heterogeneity is
characterized throughout the study area, and I investigate whether
observed local heterogeneity is correlated with jurisdictional
boundaries. By characterizing heterogeneity across the study area, this
approach is conceptually similar to the remote sensing problem of
finding the boundaries between different classes of land cover, e.g.
forest and grass (DeMers 2000). We are interested in heterogeneity
over a few different dimensions: income, race, and presence of
children (theoretically important for school district choice), all of which
are expressed quantitatively as difference across boundaries of
neighboring census tracts. The focus on differences across boundaries
has also been used in several capitalization studies, including Black
(1999), Bayer, et al. (2007), and Thorsnes and Reifel (2007). Black
(1999) and Thorsnes and Reifel (2007) both make use of house-level
sales data and Census aggregate demographic data. Bayer, et al.
(2007) make use of restricted-access Census data. The present study
uses publicly available Census data, and focuses entirely on economic
and demographic sorting.
The population data comes from the 2000 Census. Census blocks
are topologically ideal because the Census Bureau constructs blocks to
correspond with natural and administrative borders. Therefore, blocks

69

Chapter 3

Illustration 3.1: Heteroscedastic t-Statistic Compared with Village
Borders
will not be divided across towns, villages, or school districts.
Unfortunately, income data are only available at the larger
geographies of blocks groups and tracts. Block groups and tracts
conform well to villages and towns in the study area, but not to school
districts. This study uses block group level data.
The geographic data that we use includes census tracts, block
groups, and counties (ESRI 2004b, ESRI 2004a), school districts (NYS
ORPS 2001), and civil boundaries for general purpose local
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Illustration 3.2: Heteroscedastic t-Statistic Compared with School
District Borders
governments such as towns and villages (NYS CSCIC 2007). The unit of
analysis is a block group boundary, which is the arc which separates
two contiguous census tracts. ArcGIS 9.2 (ESRI 2007) was used to
extract these arcs from the census tract polygons for visualization of
the data. Each arc is associated with the block groups on either side,
and heterogeneity metrics are calculated based on the populations of
each block group pair. Each arc is categorized according to the local
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government borders it coincides with. If the neighboring census block
groups are in different towns, the arc is classified as a town border. If
the neighboring block groups are in different villages, or (since villages
do not fill the landscape) one block group is in a village and one block
group isn’t, the arc is classified as a village border. These categories
are entered as dummy variables in the regressions, with the “neutral”
category being a block group boundary which does not coincide with
any jurisdictional borders. For villages, towns, cities, and counties, the
spatial matches between block group boundaries and jurisdictional
borders are exact. Since school district boundaries do not match up
with census block group boundaries, school district borders are
classified based on a proportion of nonoverlapping population. Mutually
exclusive populations are assigned a border value of 1, and completely
overlapping populations (both block groups are in the same school
district) are assigned a border value of 0.
Each OLS regression is set up with a dependent variable
representing heterogeneity—that is, representing the strength of the
difference between the populations of the neighboring block groups—
and independent variables representing jurisdictional boundaries and
other likely influences on heterogeneity. The boundaries of block
groups with few or no households were excluded. Among these were
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Illustration 3.3: Theil Inequality Compared with Village Borders
unpopulated (or nearly unpopulated) areas such as parks and open
space, airports, and industrial areas, but also areas primarily or
exclusively populated by group quarters residents, such as a
psychiatric facility in Eastern Queens.

3.3.1 Dependent Variables
The influence of jurisdictional boundaries is tested against sorting
by income, by race/ethnicity, and by presence of school-aged children.
Income-based sorting has been most often studied in relation to the
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Illustration 3.4: Theil Inequality Compared with School District Borders
Tiebout hypothesis. A number of different measures of income
heterogeneity are used in this investigation, including a t-statistic, a
Theil Inequality measure as used by Eberts and Gronberg (1981), and a
simple difference of median incomes. The t-statistic and Theil measure
require data at the household level. Income is reported by the Census
classified into $5000 ranges for incomes below $50,000, and in
increasingly larger ranges above $50,000 up to the “$200,000 or
more” class. Previous studies have estimated household-level income
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at the midpoint of each range (Eberts, Gronberg 1981, Ottensmann
1982). This study instead estimates household-level income so as to
ensure that it sums to the block group’s aggregate income reported in
SF3 Table P54 – “Aggregate Household Income in 1999”. Table P54
reports aggregate income for two classes of households: those earning
above and those earning below $200,000. Calculating average income
for the “$200,000 or more” class is straightforward, since we are given
the aggregate and the number of households. Average income for
households in each class below $200,000 is calculated as follows. First
a scaling factor, SFk, specific to each income class is calculated as:
Y −∑ n k LB k
SF k =2×

k

∑ n k Range k
k

where
Y is the aggregate income for households in the tract with
income below $200,000;
k is the index of the income class;
nk is the number of households in class k;
LBk is the lower bound of class k;
Rangek is the range (upper bound – lower bound + 1) of class
k.
The average income, Yk, for each class is calculated as:
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Y k = LBk +

SFk
Rangek
2

SF varies between 0 and 2. If SF = 1, the average income falls at
the midpoint of the range.
The household incomes in the neighboring block groups are then
used to calculate two measures of difference: the t-statistic and the
Theil inequality measure. The t-statistic is a variance-adjusted
difference of means with a straightforward interpretation. Not only

Illustration 3.5: Racial Index of Dissimilarity Compared with Village
Borders
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Illustration 3.6: Racial Index of Dissimilarity Compared with School
District Borders
does a greater absolute difference in mean incomes affect t plausibly
(making it increase), but Tiebout sorting implies that smaller
jurisdictions should have more homogeneous populations within each
jurisdiction. More homogeneous populations have a smaller income
variance, which again yields an increased t-statistic. Note that this
does not mean the statistical sorting problem has returned, because
the t-statistic is not based on the income profile of the jurisdiction, only
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that of the block group. Illustrations 3.1 and 3.2 map the value of t
over our study area. The figures are based on the same equations as
the regressions, but using tracts instead of block groups as the
geographic building block, in order to provide maps which are visually
intelligible, i.e. not too densely clustered to make out the details.
Visually, high values of t seem to coincide with village borders (villages
are shaded blue) in Nassau County, but do not seem to coincide with
school district borders.

Illustration 3.7: Presence of Children Index of Dissimilarity Compared
with School District Borders
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An alternative measure of difference is the commonly used Theil
inequality measure. This measure is decomposable into within-group
and between-group inequality. The Theil measure is defined as:
N
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where the left-hand term represents total inequality, the first righthand term represents between-group inequality, the second right-hand
term represents within-group inequality, and
N is the number of households in both block groups;
G is the number of block groups (since the study uses paired
block groups, G= 2 always);
Yi is household I’s share of the total income of both block
groups;
Yg is tract g’s share of the total income of both block groups;
Ng is the number of households in block group g;
Sg is the set of households in block group g.
Following Eberts and Gronberg (1981), heterogeneity is expressed
as the ratio of between-group inequality to the total inequality of the
paired block groups. (In Eberts and Gronberg’s cross-MSA analysis,
they focus on homogeneity—they therefore use the ratio of withingroup inequality to the total inequality of the metropolitan area. This
chapter instead uses between-group inequality so that the inequality
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measure can be interpreted the same way as the alternative measures
—in each case, a larger value means a greater difference between the
populations of the neighboring block groups.) Illustrations 3.3 and 3.4
show results similar to the t-statistic: between-group inequality seems
to coincide with village borders, but not with school districts.
Finally, both of these income heterogeneity measures are compared
with the computationally easier difference of median incomes, based
on the tract median income reported by the Census Bureau. If this
measure produces similar results to the t-statistic and the Theil
measure, it might be preferable to use because it would be easier to
operationalize over a large geographic area. Maps of the difference of
median incomes (not shown) look similar to the maps of t and Theil
inequality shown in Illustrations 3.1 through 3.4.
In order to measure racial segregation as well as sorting by the
presence of children in the household, we turn to the well-known index
of dissimilarity, D (Kaplan, Holloway 1998). D is defined as:
D

ai bi
1


2 i A B

where
i is an index of subareas in the study region;
ai is the population of group A in subarea i;
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A is the population of group A in the study region;
bi is the population of group B in subarea i;
B is the population of group B in the study region.
D can only measure segregation between two demographic groups.
Therefore it is usually calculated in studies of racial segregation as
showing segregation of Whites (or non-Hispanic Whites) from Blacks,
Hispanics, Asians, another specific racial or ethnic group, or from all
minority groups combined. It is usually calculated for a geographic
area with many small subareas—for example, D might be calculated
for the MSA using census tracts as subareas. It can vary from 0,
indicating that all subareas (tracts) have the same proportion of the
minority population as the entire region (MSA), to 1, indicating that
every subarea is exclusively populated by one of the two groups being
investigated.
D is subject to the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), in that
small-area geographic units are empirically more homogeneous than
larger units, so calculating D for an MSA using smaller subareas, such
as census tracts, will yield a higher value than if larger subareas were
used, such as counties (Wong 1997). Furthermore, this inflation of the
index can mask spatial patterns that might mitigate segregation.
Assuming every subarea is exclusively populated by the majority group
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or the minority group, most observers would judge segregation to be
lower if minority enclaves were scattered throughout the study region
than if the minority subareas were concentrated in one part of the
region. Modifications to D have been developed by Wong (1993) that
account for spatial interaction between the populations of adjacent
subareas. If majority group subareas are found next to minority group
subareas, D can be considerably reduced. Wong has gone further in
calculating D (or one of several variants that account for spatial
interaction) separately for each census tract based on the population
of its adjacent tracts, in order to show variation in segregation patterns
across space (2002, 2005). The maps of locally varying heterogeneity
included in this chapter bear some resemblance to Wong’s maps of
locally varying segregation. This study does not apply the spatial
interaction adjustments, many of which are inapplicable to regions
which, like the paired tracts and block groups here, have only two
subareas. However, independent variables are use to control for
expected spatial interaction between subareas.
D is calculated based on standard Census racial and ethnic
groupings, with Hispanics of all races broken out into their own group.
Therefore, Whites will refer to non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks will refer to
non-Hispanic Blacks, etc. Since D can only be applied to two groups, it
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Table 3.2: Regression Results, Income-Based Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Theil Inequality (Ratio of
Absolute Difference of
t-Statistic (Heteroscedastic) Between-Group to Total)
Median Income
Independent Variables:
Model 1A
Model 1B
Model 2A
Model 2B
Model 3A
Model 3B
(Intercept)
2.688***
2.530***
0.012***
0.009*** 6314.031*** 5320.104***
(0.100)
(0.102)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(441.472)
(459.212)
Jurisdictional queens_nassau
-0.973
-0.029**
-4325.098
Borders
(0.591)
(0.009)
(2602.762)
nassau_village
2.477***
0.053***
18180.410***
(0.157)
(0.002)
(692.552)
nassau_town
0.461
0.007
175.704
(0.405)
(0.006)
(1784.675)
nassau_city
3.487***
0.055***
5286.28
(0.726)
(0.011)
(3195.271)
sdsec
0.361
1.297***
0.006
0.023***
111.652 5636.933***
(0.186)
(0.163)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(819.553)
(738.811)
Spatial
distance_km
1.732***
2.118***
0.031***
0.038*** 10123.624*** 12642.192***
Interaction
(0.225)
(0.228)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(989.888)
(1028.730)
Measures
distance_km2
-0.046
-0.069
-0.005***
-0.006***
-817.815**
-984.820**
(0.070)
(0.071)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(307.522)
(320.924)
Other
suburban
-0.489***
-0.280**
-0.002
0.003* 2869.783*** 4466.602***
Variables
(0.099)
(0.097)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(434.861)
(436.180)
adj. R-squared
F
N

0.106
114.475
7620

0.072
149.475
7620

0.131
144.705
7615

0.071
145.498
7615

0.216
263.511
7620

0.143
318.434
7620

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01

is calculated alternately for White-Black segregation, White-Hispanic
segregation, and locally dominant segregation based on the top two
race/ethnicity groups in each paired block group. Illustrations 3.5 and
3.6 compare the index of dissimilarity for the top two groups in each
pair to village or school district borders. Visually, the relationship is
ambiguous, with inconsistent matching of jurisdictional boundaries
with a medium or high index of dissimilarity.
D is also used as a measure of sorting among households with and
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without school-aged children, Dchildren. In this case, there are only two
groups, and the meaning of Dchildren is consistent. Illustration 3.7 shows
no visually obvious correlation between Dchildren and school district
borders. A map of Dchildren against village borders (not shown) also
shows no visually obvious correlation. Of interest, however, is the fact
that households with school-aged children are much more sharply
separated from childless households in the central city county of
Queens than in the suburban county of Nassau.

3.3.2 Independent Variables
Economic and demographic sorting is a feature of the American
landscape. But can observed sorting be explained as resulting of
households choosing particular packages of taxes and services? If
Tiebout sorting is taking place, neighboring block groups separated by
a jurisdictional border would be expected to be more heterogeneous
than block groups in the same jurisdiction. The study design relies on
the expectation that in a Tiebout world, there should be enough
jurisdictional variation in service levels that the jurisdictional border
itself can be used as an indication of service differences. Actual service
differences are not measured.
As described earlier, most of the independent variables are dummy
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variables representing whether the block group boundary coincides
with a jurisdictional border. The borders being investigated include the
borders of school districts, towns (county subareas), suburban cities,
suburban villages, and the Queens-Nassau border which separates city
from suburb. Most of the school districts in the study area are unified
school districts. Elementary school district borders are not included in
Table 3.3: Regression Results, Sorting By Race and Presence of
School-Aged Children
Dependent Variable:
Households
White/Black
White/Hispanic Top Two
with Children
Index of
Index of
Groups Index Index of
Dissimilarity
Dissimilarity
of Dissimilarity Dissimilarity
Independent Variables:
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
(Intercept)
0.240***
0.189***
0.165***
0.219***
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.009)
Jurisdictional queens_nassau
-0.115**
0.018
0.064*
-0.049
Borders
(0.039)
(0.031)
(0.029)
(0.032)
nassau_village
0.059***
0.018*
0.015
0.004
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.014)
nassau_town
0.055*
0
-0.001
0.020
(0.027)
(0.021)
(0.020)
(0.028)
nassau_city
-0.081
0.039
0.027
-0.047
(0.047)
(0.038)
(0.035)
(0.052)
sdsec
0.055***
0.042***
0.069***
0.006
(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.011)
Spatial
distance_km
0.079***
0.049***
0.056***
0.077***
Interaction
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.014)
Measures
distance_km2
-0.023***
-0.016***
-0.021***
(0.009)***
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.002)
Other
suburban
-0.052***
0.030***
0.046***
-0.149***
Variables
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.013
adj. R-squared
F
N

0.017
17.401
7620

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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26.104
7620

0.059
61.174
7620
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the analysis.
Independent variables are selected that might plausibly influence
heterogeneity across block group boundaries. Of primary importance is
controlling for spatial interaction, the way that spatial characteristics of
the local area influence the interaction between neighboring
populations. The motivating assumption is that households will be
more likely to move to a place if they have already socially interacted
with the current residents, and therefore social interaction between
two areas will lead to more similar populations; i.e., where spatial
interaction between neighboring block groups is high, heterogeneity
will be low. Wong (1993) discusses ways to correct D for spatial
interaction between neighboring tracts, including the length of the
shared border and a shape index equal to the average of the ratio of
the perimeter to the area (P/A) of the neighboring tracts. Since census
tracts and block groups are often oddly shaped, it seems that the
length of the shared border is an inconsistent metric of spatial
interaction. Consider the difference in the metric between two
octagons that share an edge versus two squares of equal area that
share an edge. The octagons will generate a lower spatial interaction
metric because of their shorter sides, but an ideal metric would be
more nearly equal for the octagons and the squares (assuming that the
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space outside the octagons is not water or some other barrier to
spatial interaction). The alternative spatial interaction metric, the
shape index, is a measure of compactness: a circle has the lowest
possible P/A ratio. A square has a lower P/A ratio than a rectangle. In
this case the proposed metric again seems inconsistent. Two
contiguous rectangles could offer much greater opportunity for spatial
interaction than two squares if they connect along their long side. They
would offer much lower opportunity for spatial interaction than the
squares if they connect along their short side.
One of the commonest measures of spatial interaction is distance,
and this is what is used for this study. Distance between the block
group centroids (geometric centers of mass) is the measure used.
Spatial interaction may not decline linearly with distance, so distance
may be raised to a power. Distance squared yields a so-called gravity
model. Often, both distance and distance squared will be included so
that spatial interaction may be allowed to vary in intensity and sign as
distance changes. F-tests indicate that models with both distance
variables perform better than models with only one or the other.
Finally, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether the tract
boundary is suburban (in Nassau County). Tiebout sorting relies on the
possibility of choosing between a large number of competing
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jurisdictions (Tiebout 1956), a condition which is met in the suburbs,
but not in large heterogeneous central cities. It seems important to
control for suburban location so that, if it so happens that there is an
overall higher level of tract-level sorting in the suburbs, this will not be
misinterpreted as jurisdictional sorting in the regression.

3.4 Results
OLS is used to regress the dependent variables, including three
alternative measures of income heterogeneity and four measures of
demographic sorting, on the independent variables described above.
The income regressions appear in Table 3.2. Models 1A and 1B use the
heteroscedastic t-statistic as the measure of income heterogeneity;
models 2A and 2B use Theil inequality (the ratio of between-group to
total inequality); and models 3A and 3B use the absolute difference of
median incomes. The A models include all jurisdictional borders, while
the B models include only school district borders.
In all six income models, one or both of the spatial interaction
measures are statistically significant at. Centroid distance is relatively
large and positive (p < 0.01 in all six models) while centroid distance
squared is relatively small and negative (though not significant in the tstatistic models), indicating that heterogeneity increases quickly with
increasing distance when tract centroids are close to each other (i.e.,
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when tracts are small/compact/tightly joined), but increases more
slowly when tract centroids are already far apart (i.e., when tracts are
large/convoluted/tenuously joined). The suburban dummy is significant
in the Models 1A&B and 3A&B and only weakly significant in Model 2B.
Its sign is negative, indicating that after other effects are controlled
for, neighboring census tracts in suburban areas are more similar in
household income than neighboring tracts in the city. The magnitude
of the effect, however, is generally weaker than the effect of the other
significant variables.
The general purpose local government borders appear only in the A
models. Queens/Nassau is only significant in model 2A. Town borders
(nassau_town) are not significant in any of the three models. Village
borders (nassau_village) are strongly significant (p < 0.01) in all three
A models, and shows the largest effect of all the independent
variables. Model 3A indicates that paired block groups on opposite
sides of a village border show a difference in median incomes that
more than $18,000 greater than the difference for block group pairs
that do not straddle a village border. Nassau city borders are strongly
significant in models 1A and 2A, and the coefficients in those models
are similar in magnitude to the coefficients on village borders. In model
3A, which uses difference in median incomes for the income
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heterogeneity measure, city borders are not significant and the
coefficient is one-third the magnitude of the coefficient on village
borders.
Finally, the coefficient on the school district borders variable is not
small and insignificant in all of the A models. Tiebout sorting by school
district has often been investigated by past studies, with generally
corroborating results. And the importance of school districts in where
households choose to live is a widely accepted truism. The nonexistent
support for sorting by school district these models provide is curious. I
hypothesize that previous work has failed to distinguish the effect of
school district sorting from sorting over other local government
jurisdictions. The test of this hypothesis is shown in the B models,
which exclude other local government borders from the regressions. In
all three models, the magnitude of the coefficient on increases, and
the coefficients are strongly significant (p < 0.01). Thus, investigating
school district sorting without accounting for choice over other local
governments will lead to invalid conclusions. This is discussed further
in the concluding section of this chapter.

Models 4 through 7 appear in Table 3.3. (Model 7 is based on tractlevel data.) The first thing to note is that the adjusted R2 for these
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models are extremely small. Whatever these models show, it is clear
that they do not capture the vast majority of influences on household
sorting by race and by presence of school-aged children.
As with the income regressions, the demographic dissimilarity
models show strongly significant (p < 0.01) coefficients on the spatial
interaction measures and on suburban location. The coefficient on the
suburban dummy in Model 7 is large and negative, indicating that city
households are much more likely than suburban households to
segregate based on the presence of school-aged children. Beyond that,
Model 7 shows no influence of any jurisdictional borders on the family
structure index of dissimilarity, including, surprisingly, school district
borders.
Model 4, which investigates White/Black dissimilarity, does show
significant coefficients for Queens/Nassau border (p < 0.05) and
Nassau village borders (p < 0.01), and all three race-ethnicity
dissimilarity measures have significant coefficients for school district
borders (p < 0.01). Racial sorting can of course be driven by many
factors. Tiebout sorting by race requires racial differences in demand
for public services. Other factors contributing to racial sorting include
racial steering in the home renting/buying process (Turner et al. 2002),
redlining (Jackson 1985), and the persistence of historical segregation.
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Furthermore, the race-ethnicity dissimilarity models do not control for
income characteristics, leaving open the possibility that the model is
just measuring income sorting another way. Mitigating against this
interpretation, note that the coefficient on the school districts variable
is roughly equal to the coefficient on village borders, whereas in the
income regressions the coefficient was an order of magnitude smaller.
In the Southern part of Nassau County, two pairs of census tracts show
evidence of racial sorting: one pair straddles the divide between the
Freeport and Merrick school districts, the other straddles the Uniondale
and Garden City school districts. For each pair, the census tract in the
first school district is approximately one-quarter White, with Blacks and
Hispanics predominating, while its neighbor in the latter school district
is over 90% White. This is the starkest example, but gives some
credibility to the result.
Although the model leaves much out, it is clearly indicating that
race plays a relatively greater role in sorting by school district than in
sorting by general purpose local governments. This could be
interpreted as meaning that households place more importance on
having their children attend racially/ethnically homogeneous schools
than on living in racially/ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. This
in turn raises a host of question which we cannot here address
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regarding how well movers are able to evaluate school quality
(Buckley, Schneider 2006, Teske et al. 1993), their reliance on
heuristics to evaluate school quality (Bickers, Stein 1998), and the
extent to which race dominates other factors in school choice
(Hamilton, Guin 2005).
The regressions overall provide additional evidence in favor of the
Tiebout model, but also caution the researcher to be careful in drawing
conclusions regarding which unit of government is actually influencing
the household’s decision about where to relocate. When jurisdictional
borders are not coterminous, choosing along one dimension may mean
subordinating choice along another dimension.

3.5 Conclusion
Household sorting along a variety of economic and demographic
dimensions is an inarguable feature of the American housing
landscape. The Tiebout model suggests that some of this sorting is due
to household choice regarding tax and service packages provided by
local governments. This investigation of household heterogeneity in
the neighboring central city/suburban counties of Queens and Nassau,
New York, supports this hypothesis with evidence that sharper
economic and demographic differences coincide with certain kinds of
jurisdictional borders. The evidence is strongest for sorting by income
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across small, general purpose local governments. While many studies
have found evidence of Tiebout sorting at the level of school districts,
the current study produces more ambiguous results. There is no
evidence of income sorting across school districts. On the other hand,
there evidence of strong racial sorting across school districts, though
overall racial/ethnic dissimilarity models explain little of the variation in
racial heterogeneity across our study area.
The ambiguity of the evidence regarding sorting across school
districts wants explaining, in particular the lack of a strong relationship
between income and school district choice. The following section is
fairly speculative, and additional work will be necessary to determine
which of these explanations might have merit. Two broad classes of
explanation are possible. Either sorting is taking place at the level of
school-districts, but our method is not able to find it; or sorting at the
school district level is not as important as generally assumed, and
studies that have found evidence of it have been flawed.
In the first class of explanation, it is possible that sorting is taking
place at the school district level but homogeneity is just a poor test of
the Tiebout mechanism. This would be the case if unobserved public
service demand does not correlate with observed economic and
demographic characteristics. However, this explanation is not
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consistent with the success of the method in finding evidence of
sorting at the municipal level. Alternatively, we might consider that
Tiebout competition is taking place, but the result of Tiebout
competition is that most or all suburban school districts provide the
same level of service. This explanation works particularly well with the
flight-from-blight theory of suburbanization. Higher-income households
seeking good schools will set off a “race to the top” among suburban
school districts, leaving the central city to lower-income households. A
relative homogeneity of outcomes in suburban school districts would
make fine-grained income sorting unnecessary. Investigating this
further would require data on school performance, and remains a
possible direction for future research.
Accepting the finding that income sorting by school district is weak
or nonexistent, what explanations could account for it? Note that
education is not a typical public good, in that it is net characterized by
joint consumption (additional children require additional teachers and
other resources to produce equivalent learning) and it is not
nonexcludable (a child has to be enrolled to be allowed in the
classroom). Furthermore, education can be and frequently is
purchased privately. Not only will this interfere with the expected
homogeneity, Nechyba goes so far as to suggest that higher-income
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households that intend to consume private education might
purposefully locate in a low-tax, low-performance school district
(2003a). This would work to dilute the expected Tiebout-induced
homogeneity. Finally, in an important extension to the Tiebout model,
Hamilton (1975) explains how Tiebout sorting would work in a system
of property tax financing with zoning. In particular, zoning can be used
to ensure a minimum level of housing consumption within the
community, and therefore a minimum level of taxation. We note that
school districts on Long Island do not have the requisite powers of
zoning. They therefore cannot enact the exclusionary zoning necessary
to create homogeneity. In neighboring New Jersey, school districts are
by law coterminous with municipal governments. The landscape of
coterminous municipal and school district borders is investigated in the
next chapter.
Importantly, we note that the method used in this chapter finds
sorting at the school district level when other jurisdictional boundaries
are left out of the regression. To this author’s knowledge, no previous
papers have attempted to investigate the sorting implications of the
Tiebout hypothesis over multiple jurisdictional geographies
simultaneously, and therefore no previous papers that have found
sorting by school district have controlled for sorting occurring at other
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geographies. More sophisticated (border-discontinuity design)
capitalization studies have found evidence of Tiebout choice at the
school district level, but they also find that the capitalization response
is smaller than previous studies have estimated (Black 1999, Bayer,
Ferreira & McMillan 2007).
The strongest evidence of sorting in this investigation is the finding
of strong income sorting at the level of villages and suburban cities,
small area municipal governments that control their own zoning and
that choose which local services to provide, leaving other services to
their encompassing towns. As already mentioned, Hamilton (1975)
points out the importance of the zoning function to the workings of the
Tiebout model. Villages in Nassau County can provide their own police
force, garbage collection, road maintenance, etc., but many do not.
They do all control their own zoning. The finding of strong income
heterogeneity at the borders of villages suggests the possibility that
this is due to fiscal zoning, that is, zoning designed to guarantee that
new households pay the full marginal cost of the new level of services.
Fiscal zoning is often discussed in the context school taxes. But (a)
this investigation finds no support for income sorting across school
districts, while (b) Nassau school districts do not control zoning
anyway. How much could fiscal zoning affect income sorting across
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villages when school taxes are charged by a different unit of
government and other municipal services such as police and road
maintenance are not consistently provided by the village government?
I would like to suggest that households are consuming another kind of
service, one not often talked about in discussions of the Tiebout model,
but described in Tiebout’s original paper. Tiebout proposes competition
for a fixed resource: “The factor may be the limited land area of a
suburban community, combined with a set of zoning laws against
apartment buildings” (Tiebout 1956:419). This suggests that
refocussing on the demand for housing density (specifically, low
density) may be important to further understanding the workings of
the Tiebout model.
This chapter demonstrates that new methods are necessary which
are capable of characterizing sorting across multiple geographies. I
suspect that when this or other such methods are applied to other
study areas, local context will assert itself, and sorting by school
district in addition to general purpose local governments will turn out
to be important in some counties, states, or MSAs. Further, while
research on the Tiebout model has focused on the provision of services
like education and crime control, I think the zoning regime itself (with
its density limits) has been underemphasized as a differentiated
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service households value when they vote with their feet.
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4 Jurisdictional Homogeneity and Coterminous
Local Government Borders: A Comparison of
Counties in New Jersey and New York State
4.1 The Political Geography of Suburban Local
Governments
The previous chapter discussed sorting among competing local
government geographies, drawing attention to differences in sorting
among municipalities and school district. Income stratification was
apparent at the village (municipal) level in Nassau County, while racial
sorting was the greater influence at the school district level. These
differences are observable because the method developed exploits the
incongruent geographies of villages and school districts in New York
State. This raises the question of how household sorting might differ if
the political geography were different.
This chapter focuses on the tension between localism and
segregation with regard to the political geography of metropolitan
areas. The Tiebout model assumes perfect information on the part of
residential households. In the real world households will of course not
have perfect information, but anything that increases their knowledge
of community taxes and services will facilitate Tiebout mobility and
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therefore bring local public service provision closer to the efficient
outcome. Household knowledge will be impeded by a large number of
incongruous political and administrative boundaries for different
services, such as school districts, fire districts, water districts, etc.
Coterminous political boundaries may therefore aid Tiebout mobility,
but also facilitate citizen oversight and democratic participation in local
governance (Schwartz 2001). But anything that increases Tiebout
mobility may also increase income and racial segregation, suggesting
that segregation may be higher in areas with coterminous political
borders. This hypothesis is investigated for the New York metropolitan
area, comparing New York State counties, where municipal and school
district boundaries have no relationship to each other, and New Jersey,
where school district boundaries are by law coterminous with
municipal borders.
While local government formation is long-term endogenous, the
relative stability of municipal and town structure in Nassau made it an
ideal laboratory for an investigation of Tiebout sorting, as it removes a
potentially confounding choice variable from consideration. Nassau
County itself was formed out of the Eastern portion of Queens County
in 1899, the year after the Western portion joined New York City. With
regards to Nassau’s municipal structure, a review of about two dozen
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of Nassau’s 64 villages finds most incorporations occurring in the
1920s and virtually all occurring between 1900 and 1940. The timing
of these incorporations in the earliest decades after New York City’s
consolidation suggest that these are defensive incorporations in the
same manner that the timing of the incorporations of Bronxville,
Scarsdale, and other villages in Westchester are argued to have been a
response to expansion by New York City and White Plains (Jackson
1985: 152). One important feature of New York State’s Village Law is
that villages have the power to control zoning within their borders.
However, in response to the proliferation of villages in Nassau, a
provision of the Nassau County charter retains zoning power at the
town level for any villages formed after January 1, 1963 (NYS DOS
2008: 73). In 1962, Atlantic Beach became the last village to
incorporate before the charter change, and no villages have
incorporated since then (NYS DOS 2008).
As for Nassau’s school districts, a first pass at an answer is
developed by Fischel (2009), who attempts to explain regional
variation in school district formation in the United States. Fischel
argues that today’s suburban school districts are the result of historical
forces, specifically the consolidation of one-room school districts
(typically each one-room school was its own district) in the rural areas
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that surrounded American cities prior to twentieth century
suburbanization. The number of one-room schools declined from over
200,000 in 1916 to “near zero” in 1972, while the number of school
districts declined from approximately 120,000 to fewer than 20,000
(2009: 68). The consolidation process appears to be one-way: splitting
existing school districts is politically difficult and rare. Further, this
process was driven by rural consolidation; while the number of school
districts in New York State declined by 43 percent between 1960 and
2000, the number of districts in Westchester and (importantly for our
purposes) Nassau Counties was unchanged, as both had transitioned
from rural to suburban counties earlier in the twentieth century. In the
only two states for which he is able to find old school district maps
near large cities, Fischel finds that school district boundaries show
virtually no changes (other than a handful of consolidations) after 1926
in Ohio or after 1938 in Illinois (2009: 214-15). While the history should
be investigated more deeply, it appears reasonable to tentatively
conclude that Nassau’s school districts exhibit the same decades-long
stability as its towns and villages.
Fischel surveys the overlap of populated area between
municipalities and school districts for all large cities and a sample of
smaller cities, and concludes that one-third of the urbanized population
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of the United States live in cities that are virtually coterminous with
“their” school districts, and an additional one-third of the population
live in cities that “substantially overlap” with “their” school districts.
Fischel is primarily concerned to show that the received view of school
districts largely not conforming to municipal boundaries is more
apparent than real. Why do the incongruent geographies of states like
New York and Illinois differ from this norm? To address this question, it
is useful to look at the history of local government formation in
neighboring New Jersey.
New Jersey is one of the states that, along with those of New
England, has school districts that are virtually always coterminous with
municipal boundaries (the only exception noted by Fischel being one
where two contiguous elementary school districts share a high school).
The law governing New Jersey’s school district boundaries was enacted
in the context of 1890s “Borough Fever”, the rapid formation of small
local governments in suburbanizing New Jersey. A detailed history,
based on contemporary newspaper accounts, appeared in a newsletter
of the Bergen County Historical Society (Wright c. 1994). Rural Bergen
County had been increasingly settled by commuters, whose villagecentered residences shouldered increasingly larger shares of the tax
burden of the prevailing township form of government, while the rural
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inhabitants were leery of the threat of rising taxes due to the
infrastructure needs of the village centers. The most significant points
of contention were payment for paving (“macadamizing”) roads and
building the new school buildings that the larger population required.
Six decades before Tiebout’s watershed paper, the residents of parts of
Bergen County argued that incorporation would allow them to retain
“their” tax money, rather than paying for improvements elsewhere.
School district boundaries, which were not yet required to conform
to township boundaries, had largely remained unchanged in the
previous two decades in spite of a 35% increase in the school
population, and residents of the new population centers objected to
the long distances their children had to travel to attend the rural
schools. In February 1893, a school district covering parts of both
Palisades Township and Midland Township was divided, and in the
process the village of Peetzburgh voted itself a territory including the
Hackensack Water Works, a valuable ratable. In March 1894, the
villages of Oradell and New Milford seceded from Midland Township,
forming the borough of Delford, and grabbing back the Water Works.
The incorporation was immediately challenged because the new
borough crossed township lines. In May 1894, the New Jersey State
Legislature passed a Supplement to the Borough Act giving its
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imprimatur to the new borders of Delford, but in the process creating a
general enabling law that granted a seat on the County Board of
Chosen Freeholders to new boroughs formed from territory ceded by
two adjacent townships. In the same month, in order to address
concerns over educational equity between rural and suburban areas,
the legislature enacted the Township School Law, providing for
consolidated school districts covering entire townships, but also
requiring separate and coterminous school districts for cities,
boroughs, and incorporated towns. Both laws would contribute to an
explosion of borough formation. Over the following year the County
Board of Chosen Freeholders would increase in members from 15 to 28
as villages intentionally formed boroughs crossing township lines, and
wealthier suburban areas circumvented the intention of the Township
School Law by forming their own boroughs. Borough proponents openly
acknowledged the fiscal incentive and motivating force of the
Township School Law. In 1896 the legislature took to itself the
authority for all new incorporations, ending the era of easy
incorporation (Wright c. 1994).
Wright’s account and Fischel’s account, along with what we know of
the incorporation dates of Nassau villages, suggest a general history of
the process of local government formation in the New York City
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suburbs. Rural county subdivisions—towns in New York State,
townships in New Jersey—shouldered the bulk of local government
responsibility in the mid–1800s. These subdivisions, however, were too
large for the daily travel of schoolchildren, and school districts were
formed covering geographically smaller areas than townships. In the
late 1800s, these counties experienced a large influx of commuter
population. Smaller local governments began to form—villages in New
York State, boroughs in New Jersey—to satisfy the public service
demands of the wealthier suburban areas. Defensive incorporation was
also a factor, in Nassau due to the proximity of New York City, but even
in Bergen County, “protected” from New York City by the state line,
defensive incorporation seems to have been motivated entirely by
local concerns. Initially these general purpose municipalities had no
geographic correspondence with school districts. Only in New Jersey
did specific concerns regarding equity in educational finance between
the poorer rural areas and the wealthier suburban areas lead to
legislation requiring school districts to be coterminous with townships
and municipalities. Thus, while in both Nassau and Bergen there are
many quite small municipal governments, in Nassau the villages are
contained within or divided across larger school districts, while in
Bergen, to this day, there remain many extremely small schools in
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extremely small school districts. Further, while the equalization intent
of the Township School Law was subverted even at the time, its
contribution to Borough Fever can be reasonably construed as
influencing the modern landscape of educational inequality that the
Abbott litigation addressed.
Finally, the largely unsuccessful Township School Law is a
contingent historical event that creates for Bergen County a local
government geography distinct from that of Nassau County, in spite of
the otherwise similar geohistory of suburbanization. The last chapter
demonstrated that income and racial sorting operate over different
local government geographies in Nassau County. The current chapter
exploits the differing histories of New Jersey and New York to compare
the coterminous boundaries of New Jersey with the crazy quilt
boundaries of New York State, beginning with a comparison of Bergen
and Nassau.

4.2 The Implications and Significance of Coterminous
Boundaries
Investigating the impact of coterminous borders is one question
within a broader issue of how local government structure affects
Tiebout outcomes. The more commonly engaged question is the issue
of fragmentation vs. consolidation. Tiebout came down on the side of
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fragmentation, sidestepping the issue of arriving at political solutions
to discordant preferences by proposing a system in which people
formed political communities based on matching preferences. Tiebout
therefore emphasized “exit” over “voice” (to put it in terms of the
framework of Hirschman 1970), but the world in which we live has not
abandoned voting (voice) as a mechanism for allocating local public
services, and much urban economic research models the influence of
voting (voice) as well as sorting (Ross, Yinger 1999). Indeed Fischel, a
strong defender of a Tiebout-type localism, forcefully argues that
homeowner voters (which he calls “homevoters”) are the driving force
behind the general efficiency of small local governments (Fischel
2001). Arguably, small government units are easier for citizen-voters to
monitor, and local officials in small units will be more accessible and
more responsive to voters (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961). Yet a
Long Island Index survey of attitudes toward local government found
that, when compared with Long Island, residents in the more
consolidated Northern Virginia counties of Fairfax and Loudon
expressed more positive views of local government, greater confidence
in access to public officials, higher satisfaction in local services
(including separately specified education and local police), and were
more likely to rate their property taxes as a good value compared to
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the services they receive (Center for Survey Research 2007).
While the Long Island Index report deals with fragmentation rather
than the issue of coterminous boundaries, some of the theoretical
issues are similar. Ostrom, et al. (1961) argue that citizens of
“Gargantua” (a consolidated government) may be prevented from
exerting effective control over local public officials by the bureaucratic
complexity of large organizations. A similar argument can be made
with respect to geographic complexity, such as the geographic
complexity of overlapping general and special purpose local
governments in Nassau County, possibly a contributing factor in the
dissatisfaction with local government services documented by the
Long Island Index report. It could also apply to the geographic
complexity of administrative boundaries internal to larger units of
government. For example, Schwartz calls attention to the jumble of
incongruous administrative boundaries within New York City, including
32 elementary school districts, 75 police precincts, and 59 community
districts. While conceding that each public service might have a
different ideal size based on different economies of scale, she argues
that citizen participation would improve if these boundaries were
rationalized, perhaps uniting all service functions to the community
district, even if they remain independently administered (Schwartz
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2001). Such rationalization of boundaries need not be linked, therefore,
to either consolidation or devolution.
Clearly, coterminous boundaries are relevant to the Tiebout model.
On the one hand, if coterminous boundaries force services with wildly
different scale economies into like-sized units, they could undermine
Tiebout efficiency. Conversely, by increasing household access to
information, coterminous boundaries should promote efficiency, in
either a voting (Fischel-type) interpretation of the model or a sorting
interpretation of the model. The advantages for a pure sorting model
are perhaps greater, as it might be hypothesized that the cost of
information is higher to the nonresident mover choosing among
several possible communities than to the situated resident. The
investigation of the last chapter, which concluded that income is more
important to choice among general purpose local governments while
race is more important to choice among school districts, raises the
question of how racial and income sorting will interact in the presence
of coterminous local government borders. The next section
investigates the hypothesis that racial and income sorting will reinforce
each other, leading to greater racial and income stratification in states
like New Jersey which mandate coterminous school district and
municipal boundaries.
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4.3 Empirical Investigation of Coterminous Borders
The previous chapter tested one aspect of the Tiebout model by
investigating socioeconomic sorting across differing local government
in Queens and Nassau Counties, New York. This included general
purpose local governments such counties, cities, towns (subcounty
divisions), and villages (municipalities), as well as one particularly
important special purpose local government, namely, school districts.
Remember that city and town are mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
i.e., all New York State land is part of a city or a town, but not both.
Remember also that towns may contain villages, but some town area is
not within any village. Villages control their own zoning, but they may
choose whether to provide their own public services, such as road
maintenance, trash collection, and local police, or whether to contract
with the encompassing town to provide these services. The empirical
investigation exploited the incongruity of these various local
government boundaries to look for evidence of heterogeneity (or
segregation) across these boundaries. The results indicated that
income is a significant factor in sorting across municipal boundaries,
but support for income sorting across school district boundaries was
ambiguous: border heterogeneity was significant for only one of three
alternative measures of income inequality, and the magnitude of the

112

Chapter 4
Table 4.1: Bergen–Queens Income and Racial Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Theil
Inequality
(Ratio of
Absolute
Top Two
t-Statistic
BetweenDifference of Groups Index
(Heterosceda Group to
Median
of
stic)
Total)
Income
Dissimilarity
Independent Variables:
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
(Intercept)
2.751***
0.015*** 6451.096***
0.172***
(0.096)
(0.001)
(378.852)
(0.004)
Jurisdictional municipality
1.097***
0.022*** 4078.435***
0.028***
Borders
(0.161)
(0.002)
(637.219)
(0.008)
Spatial
distance_km
1.703***
0.022*** 10183.546***
0.032**
Interaction
(0.213)
(0.003)
(841.504)
(0.010)
Measures
distance_km2
-0.182**
-0.004*** -1269.346***
-0.009**
(0.063)
(0.001)
(246.842)
(0.003)
Other
suburban
0.094
0.005** 3479.066***
0.012*
Variables
(0.108)
(0.002)
(425.130)
(0.005)
adj. R-squared
0.056
0.061
0.131
0.011
F
93.956
101.169
235.327
17.888
N
6221
6221
6221
6221
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01

effect was small compared with municipal border heterogeneity.
Models of racial heterogeneity lacked explanatory power, but contrary
to the income models, school districts rather than municipalities were
the boundaries of significance. The plausible hypothesis that
households would also sort by family structure, specifically that
households with children would tend to separate from childless
households, particularly with respect to school districts, was
unsupported, and is not investigated in this chapter.
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In New Jersey, townships historically fulfilled the same function as
New York State towns, as subcounty governments (minor civil
divisions) that bore primary responsibility for service provision. Each
county would be composed of several townships, which would provide
infrastructure such as roads and streetlights. Boroughs, as small
municipalities that tended to form around clusters of population and
commerce, can be roughly equated to New York State villages.
However, in New Jersey, when a borough forms, its territory actually
secedes from the township it was formerly a part of. (There are other
possible forms of government as well, but the township and borough
forms are the most common.) No territory in New Jersey is
Table 4.2: Bergen–Nassau Income-Based Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Theil Inequality (Ratio of
Absolute Difference of
t-Statistic (Heteroscedastic) Between-Group to Total)
Median Income
Independent Variables:
Model 5A
Model 5B
Model 6A
Model 6B
Model 7A
Model 7B
(Intercept)
2.268***
2.258***
0.012***
0.013*** 9367.965*** 10337.043***
(0.154)
(0.160)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(769.636)
(794.670)
Jurisdictional municipality
1.924***
1.933***
0.039***
0.037*** 15343.786*** 14513.988***
Borders
(0.189)
(0.193)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(944.216)
(958.384)
sdsec
-0.536*
-0.523*
-0.008*
-0.011**
-1426.374
-2693.393*
(0.225)
(0.231)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(1120.927)
(1149.993)
nassau_town
1.702***
1.712***
0.028***
0.026***
3498.13
2586.708
(0.369)
(0.371)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(1840.895)
(1847.302)
Spatial
distance_km
2.116***
2.114***
0.033***
0.034*** 9219.700*** 9434.202***
Interaction
(0.260)
(0.260)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(1296.073)
(1294.365)
Measures
distance_km2
-0.192*
-0.192*
-0.006***
-0.006***
208.795
167.713
(0.081)
(0.081)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(401.566)
(400.887)
municipality x sdsec
0.402
0.371
0.005
0.011 -6740.768***
-3813.276*
(0.319)
(0.342)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(1590.550)
(1702.433)
Other
new_jersey
0.028
-0.005**
-2708.892***
Variables
(0.114)
(0.002)
(569.023)
adj. R-squared
0.11
0.11
0.104
0.105
0.145
0.148
F
116.945
100.23
109.799
95.476
160.122
141.015
N
5622
5622
5617
5617
5622
5622
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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unincorporated, all territory is part of exactly one municipal
government, and in spite of differences in form (e.g. “strong mayor” vs
council-manager), there is no difference in the powers of different
classes of municipality (Cerra 2007). Finally, as discussed earlier,
because of the Township School Law, New Jersey school districts are
coterminous with municipalities. It is this fact which motivates the
investigation of the present chapter. The working hypothesis is that
when school district and municipal borders are coterminous, racial and
income sorting will reinforce each other, leading to higher degrees of
racial segregation and income segregation in New Jersey than in New
York.
In the first stage, the hypothesis is investigated comparing Bergen
County, New Jersey, to Nassau County, New York. Bergen County is
chosen as the best match among the candidate Northern New Jersey
counties. Nassau County is a heavily urbanized suburban county, with
a 2000 population of 1.3 million, and a population density of almost
4700 persons per square mile. At 880,000 persons, Bergen County is
the most populous Northern New Jersey County, and has a similar
population density (3800 persons per square mile). It is also
demographically similar, with a population that is 72% White nonHispanic, 5% Black, 10% Hispanic, and 11% Asian, compared to 74% /
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Table 4.3: Bergen–Nassau Racial Sorting
Dependent Variable:
White/Black Index of
White/Hispanic Index of
Top Two Groups Index of
Dissimilarity
Dissimilarity
Dissimilarity
Independent Variables:
Model 7A
Model 7B
Model 8A
Model 8B
Model 9A
Model 9B
(Intercept)
0.202***
0.192***
0.218***
0.232***
0.219***
0.236***
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.008)
Jurisdictional municipality
0.036**
0.045***
0.021*
0.009
0.014
-0.001
Borders
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
sdsec
0.034*
0.047**
0.045***
0.027*
0.070***
0.048***
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
nassau_town
0.035
0.045
0.034
0.021
0.036*
0.02
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)
Spatial
distance_km
0.081***
0.079***
0.030*
0.033**
0.018
0.022
Interaction
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
Measures
distance_km2
-0.021***
-0.021***
-0.010*
-0.010**
-0.011**
-0.011**
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
municipality x sdsec
-0.008
-0.037
-0.041**
0.001
-0.038*
0.014
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.016)
Other
new_jersey
0.027***
-0.039***
-0.048***
Variables
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)
adj. R-squared
0.017
0.02
0.007
0.016
0.016
0.029
F
17.554
17.152
7.987
14.154
16.003
25.051
N
5622
5622
5622
5622
5622
5622
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01

10% / 10% / 5% for Nassau County. Other candidate counties are more
urban (denser) and too different demographically (Hudson County
includes Jersey City and is 40% Hispanic, Essex County includes
Newark and is 40% Black). Following the Nassau–Bergen comparison,
all suburban New York State counties are compared with all New Jersey
counties of the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island CMSA .
This investigation relies on data from the 2000 Census on household
income and householder race by block group and by county. The
method developed Chapter 3 is applied to the comparison of Bergen
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and Nassau Counties. Each OLS regression is set up with a dependent
variable representing heterogeneity—that is, representing the strength
of the difference between the populations of the neighboring block
groups—and independent variables representing jurisdictional
boundaries and other likely influences on heterogeneity. Household
incomes in neighboring block groups are used to calculate two
measures of difference: the t-statistic and the Theil inequality index.
Table 4.4: Inequality, New Jersey vs. New York
Suburban Counties

Independent Variables:
(Intercept)
new_jersey
F
p

Dependent Variable:
Theil
Inequality
(Ratio of
White/Black White/Hispanic
BetweenGroup to
Index of
Index of
Total)
Dissimilarity Dissimilarity
Model 10
Model 11
Model 12
0.608***
0.410***
0.058**
(0.050)
(0.051)
(0.016)
0.007
0.048
0.01
(0.062)
(0.062)
(0.020)
0.012
0.59
0.246
0.914
0.452
0.626

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01

The t-statistic is a variance-adjusted difference of means with a
straightforward interpretation. Not only does a greater absolute
difference in mean incomes affect t plausibly (making it increase), but
more homogeneous populations have a smaller income variance,
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which again yields an increased t-statistic. An alternative measure of
difference is the commonly used Theil inequality index. This measure is
decomposable into within-group and between-group inequality.
Following a previous investigation of Tiebout sorting by Eberts and
Gronberg (1981), heterogeneity is expressed as the ratio of betweengroup inequality to the total inequality of the paired block groups.
Finally, both of these income heterogeneity measures are compared
with the computationally easier difference of median incomes, based
on the block group median income reported by the Census Bureau.
In order to measure racial and ethnic segregation, D, the wellknown index of dissimilarity, is used (Kaplan, Holloway 1998). The
categories used are Hispanics of any race, and racial groups excluding
Hispanics (i.e., White means White non-Hispanic, Black means Black
non-Hispanic, etc.). D can only measure segregation between two
demographic groups. For this study, D is calculated for White/Black
segregation, White/Hispanic segregation, and segregation between the
two most populous racial/ethnic groups in each block group pair.
Most of the independent variables are dummy variables
representing whether the block group boundary coincides with a
jurisdictional border. The borders being investigated include the
borders of school districts, towns (county subareas in Nassau County),

118

Chapter 4
and suburban municipalities (which includes cities and villages in
Nassau, boroughs and townships in Bergen). Most of the school
districts in the study area are unified school districts. Elementary
school district borders are not included in the analysis.
Independent variables are selected that might plausibly influence
heterogeneity across block group boundaries. Of primary importance is
controlling for spatial interaction, the way that spatial characteristics of
the local area influence the interaction between neighboring
populations. Distance between the block group centroids (geometric
centers of mass) is the measure used. Spatial interaction may not
decline linearly with distance, so distance may be raised to a power.
Distance squared yields a so-called gravity model. Often, both distance
and distance squared will be included so that spatial interaction may
be allowed to vary in intensity and sign as distance changes. F-tests
indicate that models with both distance variables perform better than
models with only one or the other.
OLS regression is first applied to Bergen County to confirm
socioeconomic sorting across municipal/school district borders. A
problem with previous research is that jurisdictional sorting has not
controlled for sorting absent political fragmentation. Queens County is
included in the regression, as it was in comparison with Nassau, so that
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the regression presents jurisdictional heterogeneity against a baseline
that combines urban and suburban populations. The three measures of
income inequality and the measure of racial/ethnic segregation are
calculated at census block group boundaries, and regressed on a
dummy variable indicating a municipal border, controlling for expected
spatial interaction and suburban location. In this regression, there is
only one local government dummy variable, since New Jersey
municipalities are coterminous with school districts and, as previously
explained, are nonoverlapping and have the same powers whether
their legal form is borough, township, or city. The results, presented in
Table 4.1, show that the combined municipal/school district boundary
variable is significant in both income and racial heterogeneity
regressions, indicating that both aspects of sorting are operative
across borders of New Jersey local governments. The magnitude of the
effect is, however, smaller than in the Nassau–Queens investigation,
and the explanatory power (adjusted R²) of each model is lower than
the analogous model for Nassau–Queens (compare with Tables 3.2 and
3.3).
Next, the method is applied to a regression of boundary
heterogeneity in Nassau and Bergen Counties. In this model, Nassau
villages and cities are treated as equivalent to Bergen boroughs and
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townships. Nassau towns enter the regression independently, with no
New Jersey equivalent. Secondary school districts are another
explanatory variable, but remember that in Bergen, secondary school
borders always coincide with municipal borders. The hypothesis of
mutually reinforcing sorting is investigated by adding an interaction
term for the municipal and school district borders. For most block
group boundaries, the value of the interaction term is 1 if the boundary
coincides with both a municipal border and a secondary school district
border, 0 if either or both of the municipal variable or the school
district variable are 0. In an additional series of models, a dummy
variable indicates New Jersey boundaries, to control for whether
Bergen or Nassau have pervasively higher heterogeneity.
The results, reported in Table 4.2, are not favorable to the
hypothesis. The interaction term, municipality x sdsec, is not
significant in the models relying on the t-statistic and the Theil
Inequality Index as the measures of income heterogeneity. In the
model that uses difference in median income, the interaction term is
significant but of the wrong sign, indicating lower income
heterogeneity across boundaries which are both municipal and school
district borders. The dummy variable representing location in New
Jersey is not significant in the model which uses the t-statistic, and
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while significant in the other two income models it indicates lower
general income heterogeneity in Bergen than in Nassau. The difference
in median income variable is right-skewed, and large residuals are
found around known high-income enclaves on the North shore of
Nassau County and along the Palisades in Bergen county. Residuals
are uncorrelated with the state dummy variable, so in spite of
generally larger spatial inequality in Nassau, the model is not
consistently underpredicting border heterogeneity there in comparison
with Bergen.
The investigation of racial sorting, reported in Table 4.3, is similarly
unfavorable, moreso because the models have very little explanatory
power (which was true of the Queens–Nassau models reported in Table
3.3). The interaction term is not significant for the White/Black index of
dissimilarity, and for White/Hispanic dissimilarity and the index of
dissimilarity among the top two racial/ethnic groups, the sign indicates
lower dissimilarity where borders coincide. The New Jersey dummy
variable does indicate pervasively higher White/Black dissimilarity in
Bergen, though interpreting this result is complicated by the opposite
(though insignificant) sign for combined municipal/school district
borders. Indices of dissimilarity for White/Hispanic and top two groups
are pervasively lower in Bergen. Residuals were examined for the
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study area. There was no obvious spatial patterning, and in particular
no correlation with the New Jersey dummy variable. In spite of a small
but significantly different pattern of racial/ethnic segregation
(White/Black dissimilarity is approximately 0.02 higher in New Jersey,
while White/Hispanic and top two groups dissimilarity are
approximately 0.04 lower), there is no discernible impact in the
residuals of the border heterogeneity models.
While the conjunction of municipal and school district boundaries
does not seem to increase to increase heterogeneity at the local scale,
the possibility remains that wider scale segregation will be facilitated
by this political geography. Since municipal and school district borders
are everywhere coterminous in New Jersey, but not in New York, Theil
Inequality Indices and indices of dissimilarity are computed for 21
suburban counties in the New York-Northern New Jersey Metropolitan
Area (that is, all counties except the five boroughs of New York City),
and ANOVA is performed on the counties grouped by state. The Fstatistics, reported in Table 4.4, indicate that there is no significant
difference in either income or racial sorting across counties in the two
states.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The hypothesis of this investigation of the impact of coterminous
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local governments on income, racial, and ethnic sorting is decisively
rejected. The comparison of Bergen and Queens seems to be
influenced by Nassau’s extremely high levels of income sorting.
Bergen’s income sorting is much lower to begin with (compare the
coefficients in Table 4.1 and 3.2). Since Bergen municipal and school
district borders are all coterminous, while a large majority of Nassau’s
borders are not, coterminous borders as a class will appear to be less
heterogeneous than single-scale borders. Thus, for one measure of
income sorting (absolute difference in median income), the sign of the
coefficient is negative. But for the other two measures, the coefficient
is not even statistically significant.
If the result is dominated by Nassau’s high degree of spatial
inequality, a more favorable result might be obtained for a larger class
of counties. But a simple comparison of county-level inequality and
segregation between New York and New Jersey counties also yielded
no statistically significant results. A version of the regression (not
reported) looking at all counties from all metropolitan areas in New
York and New Jersey was tried, and also failed to reject the null. The
impact of coterminous boundaries remains interesting and important.
Going forward, what is needed is a clearer theoretical understanding of
the expected effects of coterminous borders, testable hypotheses, and
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the application of the current method and new methods to more states
over a wider geographical area.
What lessons can be drawn from these negative results? In the next
chapter, I will discuss the benefits of the rationalization of jurisdictional
and administrative boundaries. One of the central criticisms of the
Tiebout model is that it is believed to create or exacerbate economic
and racial segregation. My working hypothesis was that income and
racial segregation would be mutually reinforcing, and therefore larger,
in areas with coterminous local governments. While the pure theory of
the Tiebout model might view this outcome as just another
manifestation of consumer preference, those who are already
suspicious of the Tiebout model, or those who value its efficiency
effects but recognize its contribution to racial segregation, might see
coterminous borders as making a bad system worse. The negative
results of the present investigation suggest that this concern is
misplaced. Therefore if we have good reasons to promote the drawing
of coterminous local government borders (and what those reasons
might be will be discussed in the conclusion), the present investigation
rejects one potential criticism of such a policy.
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5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Summary of the Empirical Investigation
As stated in the introduction, the Tiebout model generates claims
regarding empirical validity, efficiency, and policy. The primary
empirical claim to have been investigated is whether households
(adequately) take local government services into account in deciding
where to live. If certain assumptions are satisfied, such as perfect
knowledge and costless mobility, the resulting outcome is claimed to
be efficient. If efficient, meeting the assumptions of the model is taken
to be a reasonable policy goal. Missing in most discussions of Tiebout
is an explicit ethical dimension. I have therefore discussed principles of
spatial justice, focusing on how specifically local public services affect
the distribution of resources in a society, and how the principles of
justice and the federal structure of public service provision must
influence each other. In the current, concluding chapter, I seek to tie
these threads together in a discussion of the values in and the value of
a Tiebout-inspired, justice-constrained localism. To begin with, let me
summarize my empirical findings.
The Tiebout model implies that households will sort into jurisdictions
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based on preferences for local public services. While Tiebout assumed
for purposes of exposition that income was unrelated to residential
location, we do no great violence to the model by assuming that the
household exercises choice over a labor market, which is basically how
the United States Census Bureau defines a metropolitan statistical
area. Actual household preferences are unobservable, but if
preferences are correlated with observable characteristics such as
income or race/ethnicity, populations should be socioeconomically
more homogeneous within local government units than within the
encompassing metropolitan area. Previous investigations of this
implication are suspect because they have failed to account for a
statistical artifact and for spatial dependence in the data. The
statistical artifact is that smaller populations will be more
homogeneous than larger populations. A finding of increased
homogeneity for smaller municipalities is therefore not evidence of a
causal relationship, and not evidence of Tiebout sorting. Furthermore,
because of spatial dependence in socioeconomic data, randomly
delineated areas will exhibit some homogeneity, and smaller areas will
usually exhibit more homogeneity. Consider median income: In
Chapter 3, Moran’s I confirmed significant clustering (p < 0.01) of
census tracts by median household income in Queens and Nassau
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Counties, New York. If nearer census tracts have more similar
household incomes, then smaller jurisdictions, i.e. those composed of
nearer census tracts, will be more internally homogeneous than larger
jurisdictions, i.e. those composed of more spatially distant (though
usually still contiguous) census tracts. Thus an often-used approach to
empirically corroborating an important assumption of the Tiebout
model is biased toward its conclusion.
In Chapter 3, a new method is proposed, inspired by capitalization
studies examining home prices across jurisdictional borders, that
correlates socioeconomic discontinuities with jurisdictional borders.
This method is able to weigh the relative importance of different kinds
of jurisdictional borders. Heterogeneity is quantified between all pairs
of contiguous census block groups in Queens and Nassau Counties,
New York. Income heterogeneity is calculated using three alternative
measures: the heteroscedastic t-statistic (a variance-corrected
difference of means), the between-group Theil inequality index, and
the absolute difference of median incomes. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity
and heterogeneity of family structure (presence of children) is
calculated using D, the well-known index of dissimilarity. D is
calculated for White-Black dissimilarity, White-Hispanic dissimilarity,
and dissimilarity between the top two racial/ethnic groups in each
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block group pair. For family structure, D is calculated using households
with and without children as the two groups. Each of these
heterogeneity measures is used as the dependent variable in
regressions with explanatory variables representing jurisdictional
borders, controlling for suburban location and spatial interaction. Block
group pairs are coded 1 if they fall in different general purpose local
governments, 0 if they don’t. While block groups align precisely with
general purpose local government boundaries, they do not align with
school district boundaries. The variable indicating a school district
boundary is therefore coded based on the percentage of school district
population exclusive to each block group. This also reduces to 0 or 1 in
the case of a single school district encompassing both block groups (0)
or a school district border which exactly matches the block group
boundary (1), but it may vary between 0 and 1 if a block group’s
population partially falls into the same school district as its neighboring
block group, and partially does not. Queens County, a jurisdictionally
unified borough of New York City, is included in the regression so that
border heterogeneity will be tested against a baseline which includes
households not choosing among different jurisdictions.
The regressions indicate that households sort among municipalities
by income, but sort among school districts by race and ethnicity. The
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absolute value of the difference in median annual income is more than
$18,000 higher (p < 0.01) in block group pairs which straddle village
(municipal) borders than for the average block group pair. An
important contribution of this study is the finding that income
heterogeneity between school districts is largely an artifact of the
failure to account for the sorting effects of multiple levels of
government. School district border heterogeneity appears statistically
significant (p < 0.01) in regressions which omit the borders of general
purpose local governments (villages, towns, and cities), but this effect
completely disappears when the full complement of explanatory
variables is introduced. This behavior applies to all three alternative
measures of income inequality. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity is higher
across school district boundaries for three different race/ethnicity
pairs. Dissimilarity between the top two groups in each block group
pair is 0.069 higher (on a 0 to 1 scale, p < 0.01) for a block group pair
which is divided by a school district boundary. Village (municipal)
boundaries are only significant for White-Black dissimilarity, increasing
D by 0.059 over a block group pair not divided by a village boundary.
However, the explanatory power of the race/ethnicity models are
weak. Family structure (presence of children) is found to not be
influenced by municipal or school district borders.
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I attribute the finding of income sorting at the municipal level to
control over zoning, which gives municipal governments considerable
power to employ exclusionary zoning to control the price of access to a
community. Nassau school districts do not have power over zoning,
which means they cannot employ exclusionary zoning to control entry.
Further, as education is also privately available, there is less incentive
for income-based sorting over school districts (Nechyba 2003b). The
finding of racial sorting is consistent with established research
indicating that race is a significant driver in household choice of
schools (Hamilton, Guin 2005). While much of the previous literature
suggests that households are choosing school districts based on
quality, these results suggest a more complicated story. First, racial
sorting seems to be operative without school districts having control
over zoning. Second, income sorting may be desired as its own end,
regardless of access to particular schools. Third, zoning itself , or
perhaps the direct effects of zoning such as lower residential density or
the qualitative aspects of planning, may be a service which households
value, rather than the indirect effect of zoning on the socioeconomic
makeup of the jurisdiction.
The findings of Chapter 3 are possible because of the lack of
correspondence among municipal and school district boundaries in
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New York State. In neighboring New Jersey, municipal and school
district boundaries are by law required to be coterminous. A natural
experiment suggests itself in investigating the impact of coterminous
boundaries on household sorting. The Tiebout model assumes perfect
information on the part of mobile households. While this assumption
will not be met in practice, it stands to reason that coterminous
borders will increase the accessibility of information. I hypothesized
that racial and income sorting would be mutually reinforcing, leading
to greater spatial segregation along both dimensions in New Jersey
than in New York. The empirical investigation of Chapter 4 did not
support the hypothesis. Income and racial sorting were not higher
along the combined municipal/school district borders of Bergen
County, New Jersey, than along the primarily unidimensional borders of
Nassau; and overall inequality/segregation in the New Jersey counties
than in the New York counties of the New York–Northern New Jersey–
Long Island Metropolitan Statistical Area. However, it is important to
stress that the regressions do confirm income and racial sorting across
jurisdictional borders within Bergen County, though the effect is not as
pronounced as in Nassau County. Since municipal and school district
boundaries have been stable for decades in both Nassau and Bergen, I
conclude that the population patterns have emerged through
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deliberate choice among local government jurisdictions, supporting an
important assumption of the Tiebout model.

5.2 Spatialized Justice in the Fragmented Urban
System
Household sorting can be viewed as undesirable in its own right—
that is, as a form of exclusion—or as indicative of households making
choices regarding public services. The fragmented American
metropolis can therefore be viewed as affording more choices and
therefore higher household utility, or as contributing to racial
segregation and spatial inequality. The central argument in favor of
facilitating Tiebout choice is the claim that the resulting distribution is
efficient. This claim engenders a certain complacency with regards to
socioeconomic segregation, and can be interpreted, as Harvey
suggests much of location theory can be, as a mere ad hoc justification
for the status quo. Yet what is the value of this efficiency? Remember
that an efficient outcome, in the economist’s sense, merely means a
situation in which no one can made better off without someone being
made worse off. As discussed in Chapter 2, Rawls prioritizes equity
over efficiency. Using the example of serfdom, he argues that even
though some people (feudal landholders) will be hurt in the transition
to free labor, this is no argument against transitioning to a more
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equitable distribution (the abolition of serfdom). The Pareto efficiency
concept is therefore inherently conservative, as it is probably very
difficult to change anything in a way which does not hurt someone.
The Pareto efficiency concept is therefore of exceedingly limited use
in actual policy evaluation (Hausman, McPherson 2006). Even if the
outcome is efficient, we may look at the obvious inequalities written in
the concrete, glass, asphalt, and steel of the urban landscape and
agree with Smith (1994) that the worst-off cannot reasonably be
considered to be as well-off as they can be. The basic structure of a
society, according to Rawls, includes its governance structure,
taxation, concept of family, etc. To account for a basic structure that
allows (or discourages) the manifestation of inequality in a specifically
urban form, we must also include the following as elements of the
basic structure: land planning regime (locally controlled in the United
States), metropolitan political structure (divided between city and
suburb, and fragmented within suburbs), typical local revenue sources
(primarily property taxes with significant intergovernmental transfers),
and typical local government functions (which in the United States
includes education). The result is a basic structure with a high degree
of local control of those government functions which most heavily
influence the well-being of the nation’s citizens.
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Does this mean that Rawls would reject this basic structure? Rawls
argues for redistribution at the level of a national polity. In this, he
would be backed up by public finance economists who have typically
argued that redistribution at the local level is too easily avoided by the
emigration of the wealthy or overburdened by the immigration of the
poor. In its focus on local public goods, the Tiebout model is primarily
focused on the allocation branch of government—that is, allocating
resources towards goods which would be underprovided by the
market. If Tiebout sorting leads to efficiency in public goods provision,
redistribution could take place at the national level, in terms of cash or
in-kind transfers, or through intergovernmental grants which provide
additional resources to the worst-off areas. In the American context,
this would primarily involve providing grants to central cities which
would be financed by suburban residents, though some redistribution
among suburbs would be necessary as well.
A problem with this somewhat simple solution based on traditional
public finance theory is that even after the monetary redistribution has
taken place, because of the problem of neighborhood effects, the poor
households or the poor regions (central cities) will still not be better off
than they would be under strict equality. That is, the difference
principle will not have been satisfied. The amount of redistribution
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necessary to satisfy the difference principle may be so large—recall
Betts and Roemer’s estimate of nine times the per capita educational
expenditure to offset the burden of being Black in the United States
(Betts, Roemer 2007)—as to seriously distort allocative efficiency,
compromise the individual incentive to work, and distort the residential
location decision (particularly if the tax burden or benefits were based
to some degree on geography). It seems that the basic structure must
involve not only a redistributive tax system, but some way of
promoting socioeconomic integration or otherwise preventing wide
disparities in the quality of local public services. What might a planner
capture the efficiencies of the Tiebout model while conforming to the
demands of the difference principle?
Tiebout suggests three policies to facilitate the operation of the
model: information, persistence, and fragmentation. Since the model
requires full knowledge of taxes and services among the various local
governments, the government should publicize such information. In
the case of services, publicizing of service quality is a movement that
is gathering steam, partially through political effort, as with the
grading of schools in New York City, and partially through the
increased access to information made available by the internet. This
policy can also be commended for its contribution to democratic
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control and oversight, not just in the process of household relocation. It
seems relatively uncontroversial. An additional recommendation is the
persistence of local government spending patterns. Most consumer
durables do not change after purchase (except for expected wear and
tear), but a house becomes, in a sense, a different product if the local
government changes its allocation decision, introducing (or
eliminating) a specific tax or a specific service. So Tiebout suggests
that local governments be required to maintain existing tax and
service packages. This idea has not been pursued in the literature and
seems undemocratic and just plain bizarre. Just because we hope to
capture the efficiencies of competitive markets does not mean that we
should try to force public goods to be something they can never be.
Tiebout’s main suggestion is to facilitate choice by providing a large
number of communities from which to choose. Thus, he supports a
fragmented intraurban political landscape. Because of the obvious
inequalities between cities and suburbs, as well as because of the
desire for regional planning, a contrary literature recommends
metropolitan consolidation (Rusk 2003). There are certainly differences
among communities that households might legitimately choose, such
as the desire for natural amenities such as beaches and open space.
The Tiebout model is motivated by the idea that households ought not
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to pay for the preferences of their neighbors, and even Harvey (1973)
tepidly endorses sorting by consumer preferences. Rawls does as well,
though without considering the spatiality of service delivery. He
proposes that after government has provided public goods needed by
all, and fulfilled the redistribution goals required by the difference
principle, another branch of government (the “exchange branch”)
should use benefit taxation—taxation that falls on the party that enjoys
the service—to provide for goods not uniformly demanded by the
population (Rawls 1971: 249-250). Although Rawls’ spaceless theory
suggests that this function could be provided by a national assembly,
the Tiebout model suggests instead that this function be provided by a
system of competing local governments. Therefore, it seems that
Rawls could endorse a separation of city and suburb if each area
provides a unique set of public goods.
But the goods differently available must not conflict with the
demands of justice. While Rawls sees this as a two-stage process,
where first we provide the public goods demanded by justice, and then
we provide the public goods demanded by differing segments of the
population, it could instead be conceived as a two-scale process. As a
first pass, consider central provision of those goods demanded by
justice, and local provision of those goods whose availability does not
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impact a just distribution. We would still need to evaluate educational
provision in light of the difference principle. Would central provision
benefit the worst-off? The experience of California suggests that it
might not. When California, like other states, faced education funding
equalization following the Serrano decision, California voters
responded by passing Proposition 13 in 1978 , placing limits on local
property taxes. California’s local school systems became increasingly
dependent upon state transfers (primarily funded through state-level
income taxes). But the primary result over subsequent decades was
not to “equalize up”, but to reduce the overall quality of California’s
public schools (Brunner, Sonstelie 2006).
Does the current system of local provision benefit the worst-off?
Hoxby finds that greater Tiebout choice (a higher Herfindahl of school
districts enrollment as a proportion of total metropolitan enrollment)
leads to higher productivity, because of both higher student
achievement and lower costs. These benefits extend to lower-income
and Black and Hispanic students, although the effect is not as large as
for higher-income and White students. Alternative interpretations
include that the choice measure is dominated by choice of
nondisadvantaged students, or that the choice has both benefits and
harms for disadvantaged students, the negative effects partially
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offsetting the benefits (Hoxby 2000). This latter interpretation would
be consistent with negative peer group effects and the harmful impact
of racial segregation (Mickelson 2003). Rothstein challenges Hoxby’s
conclusion by focusing on the extent to which parental choice may be
dominated by peer group choice, which is highly correlated with school
performance (2004).
In sum, it seems unclear whether more centralized or decentralized
provision would benefit disadvantaged students. But a system where
education is primarily funded and controlled at the local level would be
unlikely to satisfy the needs of the difference principle. A solution must
include policies both to promote socioeconomic integration and to
correct the “special difficulties stemming from the social environment”
in the form of transferring additional resources to impoverished
communities. While primarily concerned with the orthodox economists’
approach to efficiency and welfare, Schwab and Oates (1991) propose
that intergovernmental transfers would have the effect not only of
compensating for the added costs of educating lower SES students, but
would lead to increased integration because higher-income
communities would be more willing to accept lower-income residents
(students) because of the added funds such students bring with them.
That is, a community could choose to enact exclusionary zoning, but
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they would pay the price in terms of their tax transfers to communities
with lower average incomes. A community that enacted a policy of
inclusionary zoning would reduce or eliminate their tax export. They
would still have to pay local taxes, but those taxes would be directed
locally, and supplemented by transfers from other localities. Thought
their approach entirely sidesteps the equity issue, it is entirely
consistent with the spatialized Rawlsian approach developed here.
Finally, any discussions of the basic structure and of
intergovernmental transfers must consider the source of tax revenue.
Property taxes remain historically important specifically for financing
local government in general as well as for education specifically.
Income taxes are important at the national level. Rawls briefly
discusses some alternatives, including a progressive consumption tax
(Frank 2007 provides a recent statement). My own view is that Thomas
Paine’s (1796) and Henry George’s (1879) argument about the
relationship between land ownership and inequality is correct, and that
George’s proposed solution of a high tax on land rents, with central
redistribution of the funds, is consistent with Schwab and Oates
welfare analysis and would also satisfy the demands of the spatialized
difference principle. With this background, specific policies for
metropolitan structure and government funding are discussed in the
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next section. I will argue the advantages of local control with fiscal
equalization.

5.3 Policy Implications
The most common policy question which emerges from the Tiebout
literature is the issue of consolidation versus fragmentation. When
Borough Fever was in swing in Bergen County, New York City was only
a few years away from forming the largest American local government
jurisdiction through consolidation. Consolidation during this period was
driven by a belief that size mattered, and that economies of scale
would lead to more efficient urban governance (Jackson 1985). In
addition to economies of scale, regionalists have focused on the
necessity for regional planning, e.g. for transportation systems, as well
as on the impact on spatial inequality, particularly between lowerincome central cities and higher-income suburbs (Orfield 1997).
Against this, Tiebout saw his model as a defense of fragmentation, but
he did realize the necessity to account for economies of scale (1956).
The primary gains in a Tiebout landscape come from the sorting into
relatively homogeneous jurisdictions of households with similar
preferences, and this seems like a fair, perhaps even unavoidable
manner for distributing access to locationally fixed amenities.
Throughout the literature in urban geography, planning, public
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finance, and ethics, two almost naturally important spatial scales
appear over and over. Those scales are the metropolitan area and the
neighborhood. The metropolitan area might be defined as a labor
market or a production agglomeration. It is the area over which
Tiebout choice might operate, in that a household may locate
anywhere in the metropolitan area and get to employment in the
region’s core. Neighborhoods are small, relatively homogeneous areas.
They might be defined in terms of face-to-face contact, or the daily
mobility of the nonemployed, or the relationship to a central amenity
such as a community center or park. But each neighborhood has a
character, for good or ill, which people in other neighborhoods will be
aware of. In a sense, regionalists might argue that the entire
metropolitan area is the most natural political unit (although most
contemporary regionalists, recognizing the political unfeasibility of
such a goal, will offer less encompassing measures), while localists
might argue that the neighborhood is the most natural political unit.
Yet neither scale can be conceived without the other. Large central
cities like New York are informally divided into neighborhoods and
formally divided into administrative districts, while the residents of the
suburbs of Long Island participate in the life of the region when they
take advantage of employment, retail, cultural, and entertainment
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opportunities in neighboring suburbs or in New York City. What is
needed, then, is perhaps not a wholesale reorganization of local
government, but a mutual learning in which the city becomes more like
the suburbs while the suburbs become more like the city.
Thus, Schwartz’s (2001) call for the localization of power in New
York City is just the flip side of Long Island Index’s call for consolidation
of government units within Long Island (Center for Survey Research
2007, Center for Governmental Research 2007). New York City
residents already choose neighborhoods based on desired features
(the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey regularly asks
householders their reason for leaving their previous neighborhood).
The City does not have to split into a thousand small municipalities to
take advantage of a Tiebout-type efficiency, or to increase citizen
participation in oversight and governance. Conversely, Nassau County
does not have to join itself to New York City to participate in regional
planning or to take advantage of economies of scale. And both New
York City and Nassau County could benefit from the congruence of
administrative and jurisdictional boundaries. Here the negative results
of Chapter 4 are useful, as this policy can be recommended with some
evidence that conterminous borders will not exacerbate the
segregation and spatial inequality that remains the biggest challenge
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to the Tiebout model.
There might be some efficiency losses if various public services
have widely divergent optimum sizes, but the benefits in terms of
citizen oversight and participation in governance might well be worth
having some public services organized at other than their optimum
size. Moreover, many “horizontally integrated” public services—
services like fire protection and police protection which must be
produced in “plants” dispersed throughout the landscape—appear to
have essentially flat cost curves (no economies or diseconomies of
scale) over a wide range of outputs (Hirsch 1968). Thus, there may in
practice be no production cost tradeoff to requiring common
jurisdictional boundaries for such services. But in arguing for the
usefulness of a Tiebout-type localism, some restriction as to the lower
size of a municipality (or central city administrative district) seems
necessary. The small average size of municipalities in Long Island and
New Jersey have repeatedly been suggested as a major factor in the
high property tax burdens of these areas (Center for Governmental
Research 2007). Yet a recent New Jersey state-level push toward
consolidation of small municipalities has met resistance from local
governments and their residents (Pérez-Peña 2010). New York’s new
governor has similarly called for local consolidation as a cost-saving
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measure. It remains to be seen whether New York might have more
success in this endeavor than New Jersey.
Resistance to the Tiebout model grows primarily out of concern for
racial segregation and spatial inequality. To evaluate possible policies
for dealing with this inequality, we must apply the justice perspective
developed in Chapter 2 and in the last section. Recall that Rawls
proposed an exchange branch of government (with its own legislature)
that would use benefit taxation to provide services targeted to people
who demand them. Given the nonexcludable nature of many public
goods (but not, it should be noted, education), it is difficult to imagine
what such services could be other than those whose benefits attenuate
rapidly with distance, i.e., local public goods. I therefore proposed that
a Tiebout-type localism could fulfill the function of the exchange
branch. But in Rawls’ theory, the demands of justice must be satisfied
prior to any allocation by the exchange branch. Goods which are
fundamental to distributive justice, such as education, should not be
allocated via the exchange branch.
If local governments are to fulfill the role of the exchange branch,
does this mean that education must be provided by a higher level of
government? Since I have conceived of the exchange branch as being
part of a two-scale system instead of the two-stage system proposed

146

Chapter 5
by Rawls, I am not proposing that local governments must be
restricted to this exchange branch role. (In Rawls’ two-stage system,
the exchange branch legislature must be restricted to deliberating
temporally after any distribution-impacting services have been
provided for.) Local governments would continue to function, as they
currently do, primarily as an allocation branch. But if they are also to
provide public goods such as education which are heavily implicated in
distributive justice, financing must be arranged so as to satisfy the
demands of the spatialized difference principle: the financing system
must be the one, out of all possible systems, which provides the
greatest benefit to the least well off; and the locational advantages
and disadvantages must be shared.
To satisfy the demands of the spatialized difference principle, we do
not need consolidated metropolitan school districts (a proposal for
which I am unaware of any proponents), but we do need to transfer
resources from the wealthier to the poorer districts. This policy is
consistent with Schwab and Oates’ welfare economics analysis of the
Tiebout model, which found increased efficiency (not just equity) in
intergovernmental transfers, and also found that if additional funding
were portable with disadvantaged students, this would provide an
incentive for wealthier communities to accept some proportion of
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disadvantaged students so as to reduce their tax export (Schwab,
Oates 1991). The policy is also consistent with modern American
jurisprudence, which in many states has been receptive to fiscal equity
challenges to the structure of educational finance. Fiscal equity
campaigns have generally proceeded via lawsuit at the state level, as
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973)
determined that school tax base inequality was not a federal issue
(although Milliken v. Brady II (1977) explicitly allowed states to pursue
their own tax base sharing plans). Legal successes in the courts have
not always translated to policy implementation. Although Vermont’s
legislature passed Act 60, implementing a school district property tax
sharing pool, for the school year immediately following Amanda
Brigham v. State of Vermont (1997), in New Jersey (Abbot v. Burke)
and New York (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State) court decisions
have been met with footdragging by the legislatures and subsequent
relitigation (New Jersey’s Abbot v. Burke has seen 20 NJ Supreme Court
decisions between 1985 and 2009).
The kind of tax base sharing enacted in Vermont inevitably brings
us to discuss the most significant source of local public revenue, the
property tax. The property tax is well-liked by public finance
economists for several reasons, including its transparency; the
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immovability of the tax base (making it a better source of autonomous
local revenue than income or sales taxes, which are more easily
avoided); and the recapture of community-created property value
(Youngman 2002). In spite of this, it is perhaps the most unpopular of
taxes, its transparency being one of the features which causes it to
draw so much ire. While property taxes are widely viewed as
regressive, this view has not held currency in public finance economics
for 35 years (Aaron 1975, Oates 1999). (Of interest, although I cannot
address it here, is the fact that the left persists in the belief that
property tax is regressive. Doubtless the lack of a committed
opposition from the left has something to do with the success of
property tax limitation measures proposed and financed by
conservative organizations.)
In theory, the transfer of property taxes out of the local jurisdiction
should be capitalized into lower housing prices. This would be
beneficial in one of two ways. First, it would work directly to reduce the
differential in housing prices in high tax base and low tax base
jurisdictions, which itself would promote economic integration. Second,
to the extent that housing prices remain high Sin the high tax base
area, the residents would in essence be paying for their exclusivity.
This would satisfy the requirements of the spatialized difference
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principle.
Rawlsian considerations point strongly toward the conclusion that
educational funding should be structured so as to equalize not inputs
but outcomes. This could involve intergovernmental grants, as I have
discussed, or moving the entire funding system or even control to
higher level of government. Considerable control of education by the
states is already in effect, leading some to argue that local control of
education is more myth than reality, and that state and U.S. Supreme
Court decisions which justify local finance in terms a desired value of
local control are suspect (Shelley 1994). Against this stands work by
Hoxby, finding higher productivity (in terms of a measure of outcome
success per dollar spent) among smaller districts, and Fischel’s
important argument that geographically defined school districts
provide benefits in terms of social capital that lead to greater citizen
involvement in local governance (Hoxby 2000, Fischel 2009).
Considering that educational performance among OECD countries
seems to be essentially uncorrelated with whether education is
financed at a national, local, or (in some federal systems) state level
(Fisher 1996: 503), it would probably be unwise to make too strong of
a case for organizing education at any particular level. Since a
wholesale transfer of educational finance to the state (or even federal)
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level is politically unlikely, a tax base sharing or equalization program
is both politically expedient and preserves the argued benefits of local
control.
This equalization with regard to need can be pursued in different
ways. Vermont collects school property taxes at a uniform rate at the
state level, then disburses the revenue to the school districts. Local
school districts may increase their own taxes to add to this foundation
funding, but must contribute part of the revenue they raise to a
sharing pool that is distributed to other school districts. By comparison,
New York State's response to the Campaign for Fiscal Equity decision is
to provide additional funding to the New York City schools ($359
million in the 2008-09 school year) out of general revenue, which
means that it is mostly paid out of state income taxes and partially
includes money collected from New York City residents. This may result
in improvements in New York City education, but it is not exactly tax
base sharing. Further undermining any equalizing intent of the law, a
voting bloc of Long Island Republicans in the New York State
legislature have made sure that the state aid funding formula includes
a fixed proportion of state education aid for Long Island, including
wealthy districts like Great Neck {(Kaplan 2011, New York State
Education Department 2010).
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In a hostile political environment, policies to address metropolitan
inequality could also be promoted via private organizations. Yaro (Yaro
2000) discusses the century-plus role of Regional Plan Association as a
planning research and advocacy group. A variety of metopolitan-level
issues, such as housing integration, school integration, a broader
geographic tax base in school funding, a just distribution of
metropolitan resources, and housing choice within the constraints of
planning and justice could be promoted privately by a metropolitanwide organization which had aspects of a regional land trust, a
planning organization, a real estate investment trust (REIT), and a
community development corporation (CDC). Regional land trusts were
first described by Swann in 1972 in a document which also introduced
the community land trust (CLT). While CLTs have primarily been used
as an affordable housing solution, Swann envisioned the regional land
trust leasing land to local agencies and CDCs, either directly or via
CLTs, in order to promote local economic growth and to provide a
community voice in land use decisions. I would suggest that the
regional land trust manage some of its land for profit, leasing to local
industry and higher-income residents. The profit would then be used to
(a) acquire more property; (b) subsidize geographically widespread CLT
affordable housing projects including advocating for affordable housing
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in currently exclusive communities; and (c) implement a form of tax
base sharing by transferring funds from high-tax-base/low-need
jurisdictions to low-tax-base/high-need jurisdictions within the
metropolitan area. By managing some its property for profit, the
regional land trust would be operating similarly to a REIT, but
dividends would fund education in high-need school districts,
affordable housing projects, and other needs in disadvantaged
jurisdictions. The income stream would give the regional land trust a
natural growth rate independent of philanthropic and government
largesse.

5.4 Future Research
I began the research for this dissertation with an idea that the
Tiebout model can incongruously serve to support democratic localism,
but also serve as an apologia for persistent spatial inequality. I was
unsure where the investigation would take me. Two empirical studies
produced results which were unexpected. First, based on the existing
literature, I expected a clear finding of income sorting across school
districts, but the magnitude of the effect was weak and the finding was
not robust to alternate measures of inequality. Instead I found that
income sorting is very important at the municipal level, while school
district sorting is dominated by race (this latter finding consistent with
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the existing literature on school choice). This result in turn suggested
that income and racial sorting might be mutually reinforcing in regions
where municipal and school district borders are coterminous, but this
hypothesis was decisively rejected.
These empirical findings cannot alone determine our attitude
toward the Tiebout model. I therefore began with a discussion of
spatial justice in the urban system. I argued that distributive justice
must take locational advantages into account, and this includes the
social and economic advantages of wealth and exclusivity. While a
number of policies might contribute to a more just distribution of
locational advantages, I focused on intergovernmental transfers. I
found transfers to be consistent with a welfare economics analysis of
the Tiebout model, as well as with the legal successes of fiscal equity
lawsuits in several states. Since local government finance can be
modified so as to achieve a more just distribution, it is not necessary to
insist upon regional governance, though some consolidation of
extremely small suburban municipalities might be sensible.
A number of questions remain. While the empirical method
developed to investigate household fiscal sorting is promising, it needs
work. In particular, the low explanatory power of the models must be
investigated, or new methods need to be developed. The current
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method relies merely on the presence of a jurisdictional border for
several explanatory variables. Perhaps a measure of service quality
(e.g. school test score differentials) could be used instead. The current
investigation used data from the 2000 Census. The release of 2010
data is imminent, so the method could be applied to newer data, and
older data as well. A change over time approach could be used, where
the dependent variable would be change in income heterogeneity.
Further applications of the method could include more
administrative districts within New York City (or another central city).
In particular, New York City high school attendance zones could be
investigated, and their influence on residential sorting compared
suburban school districts. (Alesina, Baqir & Hoxby 2004 find some
evidence of ethnic sorting at the level of school attendance zones but
no evidence of racial sorting.) New York City could also be investigated
as a “school choice” city. In the largest school district in the country,
secondary school students may request to attend any high school in
the city, although they are only guaranteed a seat in their zoned
school. Given the logic of the Tiebout model, such a system would
dampen the motivational force of this aspect of the residential location
decision. Taking into account how many students are actually able to
take advantage of choice in this system, it would be interesting to
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investigate how overall residential sorting compares to other urban
school systems.
In framing the justice discussion, I had to leave off some questions
regarding processes of suburbanization, including assuming a fiscal
sorting aspect to white flight. This bears further investigation,
particularly as to the relationship between fragmentation and
suburbanization. If a Tiebout landscape of small municipalities is more
efficient and offers more consumer choice, suburbanization may have
happened more quickly in landscapes which were already more
fragmented or which had relatively permissive laws regarding
municipal incorporation.
I began this dissertation discussing the lack of dialogue between the
Tiebout literature and the residential location literature. My empirical
chapters provide support for the view that Tiebout choice is a factor in
household location. Additional work is needed to quantify the relative
importance of this factor compared with other factors, such as
proximity to employment and social networks.
Finally, writings on spatial justice or the just city have increased
dramatically in recent years. What empirical analyses are undertaken
should partially be determined by the pressing needs of those who
may be shut out of access to good education and safe environments by
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the current balkanized urban landscape. The spatialized Rawlsian
perspective must be applied to these and other urban issues, and
critiqued with respect to its usefulness in engaging urban issues. As
the population of the world becomes more and more urban, ideas for
evaluating and achieving justice in urban environments will become
tantamount to pursuing justice for the world.

157

References
Aaron, H.J. 1975, Who pays the property tax? : a new view, Brookings
Institution, Washington.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R. & Hoxby, C. 2004, "Political jurisdictions in
heterogeneous communities", Journal of Political Economy, vol.
112, no. 2, pp. 348-396.
Alonso, W. 1964, Location and land use; toward a general theory of
land rent, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,.
Barrow, L. 2002, "School choice through relocation: evidence from the
Washington, D.C. area", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 86, no. 2,
pp. 155-189.
Bayer, P., Ferreira, F. & McMillan, R. 2007, A Unified Framework for
Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Beitz, C.R. 2005, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice", JOURNAL OF
ETHICS, vol. 9, no. 1-2, pp. 11-27.
Betts, J.R. & Roemer, J.E. 2007, "Equalizing Opportunity for Racial and
Socioeconomic Groups in theUnited States Through Educational
Finance Reform" in Schools and the Equal Opportunity Problem,
eds. L. Woessmann & P.E. Peterson, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp.
209-237.
Bickers, K.N. & Engstrom, R. 2006, "Tiebout Sorting in Metropolitan
Areas", Review of Policy Research, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 1181-1198.
Bickers, K.N. & Stein, R.M. 1998, "The Microfoundations of the Tiebout
Model", Urban Affairs Review, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 76-93.
Black, S.E. 1999, "Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of
Elementary Education", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
114, no. 2, pp. 577-599.
158

Chapter
Bogart, W.T. & Cromwell, B.A. 1997, "How Much More is a Good School
District Worth?", National Tax Journal, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 215-232.
Brunner, E. & Sonstelie, J. 2006, "California's School Finance Reform:
An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism" in The Tiebout Model at Fifty:
Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. W.A.
Fishcel, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA.
Buckley, J. & Schneider, M. 2006, "School Choice, Parental Information,
and Tiebout Sorting: Evidence from Washington, DC" in The
Tiebout Model at Fifty, ed. W.A. Fischel, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, Cambridge, MA, pp. 101-122.
Cebula, R.J. 2009, "Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis
Revisited.", American Journal of Economics & Sociology, vol. 68,
no. 2, pp. 541.
Center for Governmental Research 2007, A Tale of Two Suburbs: A
Comparative Analysis of the Cost of Local Governments on Long
Island and in Northern Virginia, Long Island Index.
Center for Survey Research 2007, A Tale of Two Suburbs: Survey
Report on Jobs, Taxes and Governance on Long Island and in
Northern Virginia, Long Island Index.
Cerra, M.F. 2007, March 2007-last update, Forms of Government:
Everything You've Always Wanted to Know, But Were Afraid to Ask
[Homepage of New Jersey State League of Municipalities], [Online].
Available: http://www.njslom.org/magart0307_p14.html [2011, Jan
23].
Clark, G.L. 1986, "Making moral landscapes: John Rawls' original
position", Political Geography Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, Supplement
1, pp. S147-S162.
Clark, G.L. 1983, Interregional migration, national policy, and social
justice, Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa, N.J.
Clark, G.L. 1981, "Democracy and the Capitalist State: Towards a
Critique of the Tiebout Hypothesis" in Political Studies from Spatial
Perspectives, eds. A.D. Burnett & P.J. Taylor, John Wiley, New York,
pp. 111-129.

159

Chapter
Davies, B. 1968, Social needs and resources in local services : a study
of variations in standards of prov. of pers. social services between
local authority areas, Joseph, London.
Dawkins, C.J. 2005, "Tiebout choice and residential segregation by race
in US metropolitan areas, 1980–2000", Regional Science and Urban
Economics, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 734-755.
DeMers, M.N. 2000, Fundamentals of Geographic Information Systems,
2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Dowding, K. 2008, "A pandemonium of confusions: Kay and Marsh on
Tiebout", New Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 335-348.
Dowding, K. & John, P. 1997, "Fairy Tale Critiques and Political Science:
A Reply to Kenneth Newton", British Journal of Political Science, vol.
27, no. 1, pp. 152-155.
Dowding, K. & John, P. 1994, "Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical
Literature", Urban Studies, vol. 31, no. 4/5, pp. 767-797.
Duncombe, W. & Yinger, J. 1997, "Why Is It So Hard to Help Central City
Schools?", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 16, no.
1, pp. 85-113.
Eberts, R.W. & Gronberg, T.J. 1981, "Jurisdictional Homogeneity and
the Tiebout Hypothesis", Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 10, no. 2,
pp. 227-239.
ESRI 2007, ArcGIS, Redlands, CA.
ESRI 2004a, U.S. Census Tracts, ESRI, Redlands, CA.
ESRI 2004b, U.S. Counties, ESRI, Redlands, CA.
Fischel, W.A. 2009, Making the Grade: The Economic Evolution of
American School Districts, University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ill.
Fischel, W.A. 2001, The homevoter hypothesis : how home values
influence local government taxation, school finance, and land-use
policies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Fisher, R.C. 1996, State and local public finance, Irwin, Chicago.
160

Chapter
Frank, R.H. 2007, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the
Middle Class, University of California Press, Berkeley.
George, H. 1879, Progress and Poverty, [1938] edn, Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation, New York.
Gordon Tullock 1971, "Public Decisions as Public Goods", The Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 79, no. 4, pp. 913-918.
Greenberg, M.R. & Schneider, D., 1996, , Environmentally devastated
neighborhoods perceptions, policies, and realities [Homepage of
Rutgers University Press], [Online].
Hamilton, B.W. 1975, "Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of
Local Governments", Urban Studies, vol. 12, pp. 205-211.
Hamilton, L.S. & Guin, K. 2005, "Understanding How Families Choose
Schools" in Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in
Education Policy, eds. J.R. Betts & T. Loveless, Brookings Institution
Press, Washington, DC, pp. 40-60.
Harris, D.R. 2001, "Why Are Whites and Blacks Averse to Black
Neighbors?", Social science research, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 100-116.
Harvey, D.W. 1996, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference,
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
Harvey, D.W. 1973, Social justice and the city, Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore.
Hausman, D.M., & McPherson, M.S. 2006, Economic analysis, moral
philosophy, and public policy, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Heikkila, E.J. 1996, "Are municipalities Tieboutian clubs?", Regional
Science and Urban Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 203-226.
Hirsch, W.Z. 1968, "The Supply of Urban Public Services", Issues in
Urban Economics, eds. H.S. Perloff & L. Wingo Jr., Published for
Resources for the Future [Washington] by the Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, MD.
Hirschman, A.O. 1970, Exit, voice, and loyalty; responses to decline in
161

Chapter
firms, organizations, and states, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Hoxby, C.M. 2000, "Does Competition among Public Schools Benefit
Students and Taxpayers?", The American Economic Review, vol.
90, no. 5, pp. pp. 1209-1238.
Hurley, A., 1995, Environmental inequalities : class, race, and
industrial pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980, University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
Ihlanfeldt, K.R. & Sjoquist, D.L. 1998, "The Spatial Mismatch
Hypothesis: A Review of Recent Studies and Their Implications for
Welfare Reform", Housing Policy Debate, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 849-892.
Inman, R.P. 1979, "The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments: An
Interpretive Review" in Current Issues in Urban Economics, eds. P.
Mieszkowski & M. Straszheim, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, pp. 270-321.
Jackson, K.T. 1985, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the
United States, Oxford University Press, New York.
John, P., Dowding, K. & Biggs, S. 1995, "Residential Mobility in London:
A Micro-Level Test of the Behavioural Assumptions of the Tiebout
Model", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 379397.
Johnston, R.J. 1984, Residential segregation, the state and
constitutional conflict in American urban areas, Academic Press,
London ; Orlando.
Johnston, R.J., Gregory, D., Pratt, G. & Watts, M. (eds) 2000, The
dictionary of human geography, 4th edn, Blackwell, Oxford.
Kain, J.F. 2004, "A pioneer's perspective on the spatial mismatch
literature", Urban Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 7-32.
Kain, J.F. 1968, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization", The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 175-197.
Kaplan, D.H., Hodler, T.W., Wheeler, J.O. & Holloway, S.R. 2004, Urban
162

Chapter
geography, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ.
Kaplan, D.H. & Holloway, S.R. 1998, Segregation in Cities, Association
of American Geographers, Washington, DC.
Kaplan, T. 2011, As Schools Face Cutbacks, a Debate Over What’s Fair.
Katznelson, I. 1997, "Social Justice, Liberalism, and the City:
Considerations on David Harvey, John Rawls, and Karl Polanyi" in
The Urbanization of Injustice, eds. A. Merrifield & E. Swyngedouw,
New York University Press, New York, pp. 45-64.
Kay, A. 2005, "Territorial justice and devolution", British Journal of
Politics and International Relations, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 544-560.
Kay, A. & Marsh, A. 2008, "On the tenacity of Tiebout: A response to
Dowding", New Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 349-355.
Kay, A. & Marsh, A. 2007, "The Methodology of The Public Choice
Research Programme: The Case Of 'Voting With Feet'.", New
Political Economy, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 167.
Krysan, M. 2002, "Whites Who Say They'd Flee: Who Are They, and
Why Would They Leave?", Demography, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 675696.
Lynch, A.K. & Rasmussen, D.W. 2004, "Proximity, Neighbourhood and
the Efficiency of Exclusion.", Urban Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 285.
Mickelson, R.A. 2003, "The Academic Consequences of Desegregation
and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools", North Carolina Law Review, vol. 81, pp. 1513-1562.
Mieszkowski, P.M. & Mills, E.S. 1993, "The Causes of Metropolitan
Suburbanization", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, no. 3,
pp. 135.
Miller, R.W. 1975, "Rawls and Marxism" in Reading Rawls : critical
studies on Rawls’ A theory of justice, ed. N. Daniels, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, California, pp. 206.
Mills, E.S. & Resources for the Future 1972, Studies in the structure of
the urban economy, Published for Resources for the Future by
163

Chapter
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Muth, R.F. 1969, Cities and housing; the spatial pattern of urban
residential land use, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Nechyba, T.J. 2003a, "Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private
School Attendance", International Economic Review, vol. 44, no. 1,
pp. 179-204.
Nechyba, T.J. 2003b, "School finance, spatial income segregation, and
the nature of communities", Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 54,
no. 1, pp. 61-88.
New York State Education Department 2010, Aug. 24, 2010-last
update, State of New York 2010-11 State Aid Projections. Available:
http://www.nysed.gov/stateaid/dist/sr0927/cb/280407.HTML [2011,
2/4].
Newton, K. 1997, "Residential Mobility in London: Rational Choice Fairy
Tale, Utopia or Reality", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 148-151.
Nozick, R. 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford.
Nussbaum, M. 2001, "The Enduring Significance of John Rawls.",
Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. 47, no. 45, pp. B7.
NYS CSCIC 2007, New York State Civil Boundaries, NYS Office of Cyber
Security & Critical Infrastructure Coordination (CSCIC), Albany, NY.
NYS DOS 2008, New York State Local Government Handbook, 5th edn,
NYS Department of State, Albany, NY.
NYS ORPS 2001, School Districts of New York State, 1st edn, NYS Office
of Real Property Services, Albany, NY.
Oates, W.E. 1999, Local Property Taxation: An Assessment, Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA.
Oates, W.E. 1969, "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public
Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax
Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis", The Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 77, no. 6, pp. 957-971.
164

Chapter
Orfield, G. 1996, "Segregated Housing and School Resegregation" in
Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board
of Education, eds. G. Orfield & S.E. Eaton, The New Press, New York
City, pp. 291-330.
Orfield, M. 1997, Metropolitics : a regional agenda for community and
stability, Brookings Institution Press ; Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, Mass.
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.M. & Warren, R. 1961, "The Organization of
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry", The
American Political Science Review, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 831-842.
Ottensmann, J.R. 1982, "Neighborhood Heterogeneity Within an Urban
Area", Urban Studies, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 391-395.
Pacione, M. 2005, Urban geography : a global perspective, 2nd edn,
Routledge, London ; New York.
Pack, H. & Pack, J.R. 1977, "Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban
Homogeneity", Urban Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 191-201.
Paine, T. 1796, Agrarian Justice, .
Peffer, R.G. 1990, Marxism, morality, and social justice, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Pérez-Peña, R. 2010, New Jersey’s Tiniest Towns Fight Push to Merge.
Pirie, G.H. 1983, "On spatial justice.", Environment & Planning A, vol.
15, no. 4, pp. 465-473.
Pogge, T.W. 2005, "Real World Justice", Journal of Ethics, vol. 9, no. 12, pp. 29-53.
Pogge, T.W. 2002, World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan
responsibilities and reforms, Polity, Cambridge; Malden, MA.
Pulido, L. 2000, "Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and
Urban Development in Southern California", Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 12.
Rawls, J. 1999, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press,
165

Chapter
Cambridge, Mass.
Rawls, J. 1993, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New
York.
Rawls, J. 1971, A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Ross, S. & Yinger, J. 1999, "Sorting and voting: A review of the
literature on urban public finance" in Handbook of Regional and
Urban Economics, eds. E.S. Mills & P. Cheshire, Elsevier, , pp. 20012060.
Rossi, P.H. 1980, Why families move, 2d ed. edn, Sage Publications,
Beverly Hills.
Rothstein, J. 2004, Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation
of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Effects of
Inter-district Competition, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rusk, D. 2003, Cities without suburbs : a Census 2000 update,
Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Distributed by Johns Hopkins
University Press, Washington, D.C.; Baltimore, Md.
Samuelson, P.A. 1954, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", The
review of economics and statistics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 387-389.
Schlosberg, D. 2007, Defining environmental justice : theories,
movements, and nature, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New
York.
Schwab, R.M. & Oates, W.E. 1991, "Community composition and the
provision of local public goods : A normative analysis", Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 217-237.
Schwartz, A.E. 2001, "Tax and the City" in Rethinking the Urban
Agenda: Reinvigorating the Liberal Tradition in New York City and
Urban America, eds. J.H. Mollenkopf & K. Emerson, Century
Foundation Press, New York City, pp. 63-74.
Shelley, F.M. 1994, "Local control and financing of education: a
perspective from the American state judiciary", Political
Geography, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 361.
166

Chapter
Smith, D.M. 2000a, Moral Geographies: Ethics in a World of Difference,
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
Smith, D.M. 2000b, "Moral progress in human geography: transcending
the place of good fortune.", Progress in Human Geography, vol. 24,
no. 1, pp. 1.
Smith, D.M. 2000c, "Social justice revisited", Environment and Planning
A, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 1149-1162.
Smith, D.M. 1994, Geography and Social Justice, Blackwell Publishers,
Oxford.
Soja, E.W. 2010, Seeking spatial justice, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis.
Stein, R.M. 1987, "Tiebout's Sorting Hypothesis", Urban Affairs
Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 140-160.
Teske, P., Schneider, M., Mintrom, M. & Best, S. 1993, "Establishing the
Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers, and the
Competitive Local Market for Public Goods", The American Political
Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 702-713.
Thorsnes, P. & Reifel, J.W. 2007, "Tiebout Dynamics: Neighborhood
Response to a Central-City/Suburban House-Price Differential",
Journal of Regional Science, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 693-719.
Thünen, J.H.v. 1966 [1826], Von Thünen's Isolated State: an English
edition of Der isolierte Staat, Pergamon Press, Oxford; London.
Tiebout, C.M. 1956, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 416-24.
Turner, M.A., Ross, S.L., Galster, G.C. & Yinger, J. 2002, Discrimination
in Metropolitan Housing Markets: National Results from Phase I
HDS 2000, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
Wenar, L. 2008, "John Rawls" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008 edn,.
Whiteman, J. 1983, "Deconstructing the Tiebout hypothesis",
Environment & Planning D: Society & Space, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 339167

Chapter
353.
Wong, D.W.S. 2005, "Formulating a General Spatial Segregation
Measure.", Professional Geographer, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 285-294.
Wong, D.W.S. 2002, "Modeling Local Segregation: a Spatial Interaction
Approach.", Geographical & Environmental Modelling, vol. 6, no. 1,
pp. 81-97.
Wong, D.W.S. 1997, "Spatial dependency of segregation indices.",
Canadian Geographer, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 128-136.
Wong, D.W.S. 1993, "Spatial Indices of Segregation", Urban Studies,
vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 559-572.
Woo, Y.L. 2004, Income Inequality and Racial Segregation:
Jurisdictional Fragmentation or Exclusionary Zoning Laws?, PhD
edn, Graduate School and University Center, City University of New
York, New York, NY.
Wright, K. c. 1994, Punkin Duster Finds the Woodchuck Borough: A
Centennial Review of Bergen County Borough Fever 1894-95.
Yaro, R.D. 2000, "Growing and Governing Smart: A Case Study of the
New York Region" in Reflections on Regionalism, ed. B. Katz,
Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, pp. 43-77.
Young, I.M., 1990, Justice and the politics of difference, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Youngman, J.M. 2002, "Property Taxation: Fairness and Popularity,
Perceptions and Reality" in Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate, eds.
J.J. Thorndike & D.J. Ventry, Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC,
pp. 221-252.

168

